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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
LAKElAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE, 
LtC. 
Plaioti IT-A ppellan 
y -
ORDER GRANTING MOnON TO 
AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON 
APPEAL 
TIlE HARTFORD FIRE INSURAN 
OMPANY. a Connecticut corponation, 
Su~me Coun Docket No 37987-2010 
Kootenai Count)' Docket No. 2008-7069 
Defendant-Appellanl. 
A MOnON TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL ~'a! filed by counsel for 
Appellant 00 Mareh 28. 20 II . Therefore. good c:aux appeari:n 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOnON TO AUGMENT CLERK'S 
RECORD ON APPEAL be. and hereby ij, GRANTED and the lugmmtation record shall include 
the documents listed below. file stamped copies of which ICcompanied this Molion: 
I. Plaintiff, F.xpen Witness DiJclosure, file-stamped September 24. 2009; 
2. Motion for Relief from Pretrial Order. file-stamped NOYCOIm 16,2009; 
3. Defendant's MOI.ion in Limine re: Oamaaes. liIe-stamped February 9. 2010; 
4. PlaintiJrs Notice of Filin8 Proposed Jury lnstnJc:tions. file-stamped Mareh 1 S. 2010; 
S. Memorandwn LO Suppon of Motion 10 Continue, file-stamped MatCh 19.2010; 
6. Affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline in SUpport of MOIion to Continue: with .uac:hmmts. file-
stamped MatCh 19,2010: 
7. Plaintilrs Motion 10 Continue Trial. file-stamped March 19.2010; 
Plaintitrs Memorandum in Suppon of Motion to Reconsider Dismissal of PIAintilrs 
Bad Faith Claims. file-swnped April 6, 2010; 
9. Plainlilrs Objections 10 Defendant's Proposed Jury Instruc:tlons. file-stamped May 26. 
2010; 
10_ Plaintilr, Objmions 10 and Propo1Cd Special Verdict Forro. receive-stamped May 26. 
2010; 
11. Jury 10Stl\lCtioos Given, file-stamped May 211, 2010: 
12. Special Verdict. file-stamped May 28, 2010; and 
13. PlaintilTs' Supplemental Expen Witoess DiKlosure. file-stamped No\ember4. 2009. 
RDER ORANTING MOTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL - Docket No. 
37987-2010 
l! :~ DATED this _ , _ day of 2011 . 
CC: l:ounsel of Record 
W 
---l 
(.) 
« 
-.J 
For the Supreme Court 
'6 
-
o 
~ 
. 
~ 
o 
u [;2 
;;;J 
< 
ORDER GRANTING MOnON TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL - Docket No. 
37987-2010 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
LAKELAND TRUE V ALUE HARDWARE, 
LLC, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 
DENYING IN PART THE MOTION 
TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD 
ON APPEAL 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation, 
Supreme Court Docket No. 37987-2010 
Kootenai County Docket No. 2008-7069 
Defendant-Appellant. 
A MOTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL was filed by counsel for 
Respondent on May 25, 2011. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondent's MOTION ero AUGMENT CLERK'S 
RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED in part, and the augmenta ' lot1 record shall include the 
documents listed below, file-stamped copies of which accompanied th;- Motion: 
1. Hartford's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Relief fro.!. ~-'etrial Order, file-stamped 
January 6,2010; 
2. Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, file-', tamped April 16, 2010; and 
3. Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Initial Pretrial Order, file-stamped June 
22,2009. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that Respondent's MOTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S 
RECORD be, and hereby is, DENIED in part, as the document listed below does not bear the file 
stamp of the district court. 
1. Lakeland counsel's email correspondence to the district court dated May 26,2010. 
I'J 
DATED this )-,.- day of June, 2011. 
For the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
cc: Counsel of Record 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE MOTION TO AUGMENT 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL - Docket No. 37987-2010 
Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@ballfarley.com 
Bryan A. Nickels 
ISB #6432; ban@hallfarley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:\3\3-472.9\PretriaJ ReliefOpp,doc 
Attorneys for Defendant 
STATE OF IDAHO l ;~~~;Y OF KOOTENAI( SS 
2UIO JAN -6 AH 10: 39 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
DEPuty 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LAKELAND TRUE V ALUE HARDWARE, 
L.L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation, 
Defendant 
Case No. CV -08-7069 
HARTFORD'S OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RELIEF FROM PRETRIAL ORDER 
COMES NOW the defendant The Hartford Fire Insurance Company (hereinafter 
"Hartford"), by and through its counsel of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and 
hereby submits this opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Pretrial Order, filed 
November 16, 2009 ("plaintiffs Motion"). For the reasons stated herein, plaintiffs Motion 
should be denied, as the designation of Mr. Underdown was untimely, results in prejudice to 
Hartford through the belated presentation of an expert differing from the original designation, 
and is ultimately irrelevant based upon this Court's summary judgment order. 
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ARGUMENT , 
A. Plaintiffs disclosure orMc. Underdown is untimely. 
As an initial matter, plaintiffs identification of Mr. Underdown is untimely and violates 
this Court's pre-trial scheduling order, a point which plaintiff does not dispute. For this reason 
alone, plaintiff'S identification ofMc. Underdown as an expert in this matter should be stricken. 
Rule 16(i) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
If a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pre-trial order, ... the 
judge, upon motion or his own initiative, may make such orders with regard 
thereto as are just, and among others any of the orders provided in Rule 
37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 16(i). Rule 37(b)(2)(B) and (C) pennit the Court to enter an order prohibiting 
the disobedient party "from introducing designated matters in evidence," or "striking out 
pleadings or parts thereof." Idaho R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B) and (C). It is within the discretion of 
the trial court to exclude evidence as a sanction for non-compliance with pre-trial orders. 
l.R.C.P. 16(i); Fish Haven Resort, Inc. v. Arnold, 121 Idaho 118, 121,822 P.2d IllS, 1118 (Ct. 
App. 1991). 
A party's failure to disclose expert witnesses in accordance with a district courts 
scheduling order is a proper basis to strike expert testimony. See Carnell v, Barker Management, 
Inc., 137 Idaho 322,328,48 P.3d 651, 657 (2002). The Idaho Court of Appeals has applied that 
Rule as wen, and sanctioned parties for non-compliance with pretrial orders. See Priest v. 
Landon, 135 Idaho 898, 26 P.3d 1235 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the expert witness testimony 
offered by the plaintiff was excluded because the plaintiff did not disclose her expert witnesses 
by the deadline set forth in the pretrial order). 
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In the present case, the Court filed its Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and 
Initial Pretrial Order on June 22, 2009 ("Scheduling Order"). With respect to experts, the 
Scheduling Order provided, in relevant part: 
5. EXPERT WITNESSES: Not later than one hundred eighty (180) days 
before trial, plaintiff(s) shall disclose all experts to be called at trial. Not later 
than one hundred fifty (150) days before trial, defendant(s) shall disclose all 
experts to be called at trial. Such disclosure shall consist of at least the subject 
matter upon which the expert is expected to testifY and the substance of any 
opinions to which the expert is expected to testifY. The disclosure shall be 
contemporaneously filed with the Court. 
(Scheduling Order, at 4.) With a trial date of March 22, 2010, plaintiff's deadline to disclose 
experts was September 23, 2009. 
On September 23, 2009, plaintiffs submitted its Plaintiff's Expert Witness Disclosure, 
which identified two experts: Dan Harper and Drew Lucurell. See Affidavit of Counsel in 
Support of Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Pretrial Order ("Counsel Aff.") filed 
herewith, at Exhibit A. The scope of Mr. Lucurell's expected testimony was as follows: 
Mr. Lucurell will testify as to whether the practices engaged in by Defendant's 
adjusters was reasonable, including but not limited to 1) the reasonableness of 
making partial payment towards damaged inventory 2) the reasonableness of 
imposing GAAP accounting principles when interpreting a policy that does not 
set forth the GAAP is applicable 3) the reasonableness of Hartford's delay in 
evaluating the inventory 4) the reasonableness of Hartford refusing to deal with 
Adjuster's International, 5) the reasonableness of requesting purchase inventories, 
bank statements, canceled checks and other information and 6) the reasonableness 
of withholding payment pending receipt of documentation from the insured in 
light of the fact that the policy in question does not authorize that conduct. 
(Jd) Hartford subsequently made its disclosures on October 22, 2009. (Id at Exh. B.) 
However, on October 19, 2009, just 3 days prior to Hartford's own disclosure deadline, 
plaintiff's counsel's office emailed supplemental discovery responses purporting to identifY a 
new expert, Robert Underdown. (Id. at Exh. C.) This supplement provided a CV, but provided 
little information about what Mr. Underdown was to testifY in regards to: 
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(b) At this point, after preliminary review, Mr. Underdown is expected to testify 
on the standard of care for claims handling, claims supervision and general 
industry standards. At this time, we do not know the substance of every fact and 
opinion to which Mr. Underdown is expected to testify because he has not 
reviewed the necessary documents. 
(c) Mr. Underdown has not prepared a report as yet. We expect his report in the 
next few days. 
(/d.) Subsequently, on November 4, 2009, plaintiffs submitted Plaintiffs' Supplemental Expert 
Witness Disclosure, formally disclosing Mr. Underdown, almost two weeks after Hartford's 
expert deadlines had passed. (Id. at Exh. D.) The supplemental disclosure included a report 
authored by Mr. Underdown and dated November 3, 2009. (ld.) Plaintiff thereafter provided 
additional supplemental discovery responses on November 4, 2009, which attempted to 
summarize Mr. Underdown's anticipated scope of testimony: 
(b) Mr. Underdown will testify as to whether the practices engaged in by 
Defendant's adjusters was reasonable, including but not limited to 1) the 
reasonableness of making partial payment towards damaged inventory 2) the 
rea'lonableness of Hartford's delay in evaluating the inventory 3) the 
reasonableness of Hartford refusing to deal with Adjuster's International, 4) the 
reasonableness of requesting purchasing invoices, bank statements canceled 
checks and other information and 5) the reasonableness of withholding payment 
pending receipt of documentation from the insured in light of the fact that the 
policy in question does not authorize that conduct. 
(ld at Exh. E, p. 3.) Supplemental responses were then provided on December 4,2009, which 
included additional information with respect to Mr. Lucurell. (Id at Exh. P.) 
Thus, it is undisputed that Mr. Underdown has been disclosed in an untimely fashion. 
Plaintiffs excuse for this, however, is that it had difficulties locating an expert, and that it would 
suffer some "injustice" because it, itself, failed to undertake a prompt and comprehensive search 
for an expert. I Plaintiff cites two cases for this proposition, neither of which supports its 
position. 
I Despite claims of difficulty in locating an expert, plaintiff concedes that it eventually located Mr. Underdown by 
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First, plaintiff cites the criminal case of State v. Siegel, 137 Idaho 538, 50 P.3d 1033 (Ct. 
App. 2002), for the proposition that prejudice must be shown with respect to a late witness. 
However, a correct reading of Siegel demonstrates that the Court actually addressed 'fair trial' 
considerations of motions to continue in light of a late witness: "The denial of such a motion will 
be disturbed on appeal only if it is shown that the tardiness of the disclosure so prejudiced the 
defendant's case preparation that the defendant was denied a fair trial." ld. at 541. The Court 
does later address the issue of late disclosure of expert witnesses, and reached a result that is 
consistent with Hartford's request to bar plaintiff's use of Mr. Underdown - specifically, the 
Court affinned the Wlderlying court's exclusion of late-disclosed expert. In doing so, the Court 
noted that "[t}he adversary process could not function effectively without adherence to rules 
of procedure that govern the orderly presentation of facts and arguments to provide each 
party with a fair opportunity to assemble and submit evidence to contradict or explain the 
opponentts case." Id. at 543 (emphasis added). Although obviously written with the backdrop 
of constitutional considerations governing criminal proceedings, this principle is no less true in 
the civil system. 
Plaintiff also cites State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 945 P.2d 1 (1997), for this same 
"prejudice" concept regarding the late disclosure of witnesses in criminal actions. In addition to 
Lamphere being a criminal matter, Lamphere did not address an expert witness, but, rather, a fact 
witness. The cases cited by Hartford, however, regarding the exclusion of expert witnesses 
(Carnell and Priest, supra), were civil matters that did not entertain prejudice arguments (even 
simply locating him on Google. Affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline in Support of Motion for Relief from Pretrial Order, 
at ~7. Mr. Underdown's web URL is ht.t.p:llwww.insurance-exPert.coml. Thus, locating Mr. Underdown would not 
have reasonably taken the almost year and a half search time claimed by plaintiff. Notably, plaintiff neither objected 
to the Scheduling Order deadlines, nor otherwise moved for an extension of the expert deadlines to allow additional 
time, if additional time was truly needed. 
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where made, such as in Carnell). Disregard for an established scheduling order is sufficient 
grounds to exclude expert testimony, as was the case in Carnell: "all of this [discussion of IRE 
702 admissibility] is immaterial because the appellants never disclosed Bids1rup as an expert 
witness, in violation of the district court's scheduling order." Id. at 328. 
Accordingly, this Court should reject plaintiffs attempts to flaunt the Scheduling Order 
because of its own dilatory conduct. As such, this Court should deny plaintiffs Motion, and 
strike plaintiff's disclosure of Mr. Underdown. 
B. Even were prejudice a required showing, Hartford has suffered prejudice as a result of the 
untimely disclosure of Mr. Underdown 
Turning from the question of timeliness, plaintiff argues, in essence, that Mr. Underdown 
is effectively "exactly" the same as Mr. LucureU, and, as such, Hartford would suffer no 
prejudice from the substitution of Mr. Underdown for Mr. Lucurell? In addition to disregarding 
the fact that Hartford has a right to make its expert selections based upon the timely disclosure of 
experts by plaintiff pursuant to the Court's Scheduling Order, this also ignores three other key 
points. 
First, Mr. Lucurell and Mr. Underdown do not have comparable backgrounds. Mr. 
Lucurell is associated with Adjusters International, an independent loss adjusting firm; Mr. 
Lucure1l's CV also reflects his being licensed as a public adjuster and a lawyer. Mr. Underdown, 
on the other hand, is primarily a professional expert, with licenses as an insurance producer and 
alleged expertise in claims handling, agentlbroker standards, and bad faith issues/claims, and 
with career experience in claims adjusting and risk management. Thus, the two individuals, 
while having careers relating to the insurance field, come from completely different - and, 
indeed, competing - perspectives of the field. Whereas Mr. Lucurell's role is typically to 
2 As an interesting aside, plaintiff bas yet to formally withdraw its designation of Mr. Lucurell, even while 
attempting to substitute Mr. Underdown in his place. 
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advance the claim of an insured in reaching a settlement with an insured, Mr. Underdown has 
worked the claims adjusting and producer side of the industry. Thus, selection of a responsive 
expert for Mr. Underdown (versus Mr. Lucurell) patently requires different considerations. 
Second, the proffered scope of testimony, while similar, is not identical. Whereas Mr. 
Lucurell's anticipated testimony included discussion of GAAP, Mr. Underdown's does not. 
(Compare Counsel Aff., Exh. A with Exh. E.) Again, selection of an expert based upon Mr. 
Lucurell's anticipated testimony required different considerations than that for Mr. Underdown. 
TIllrd, plaintiff's attempts to largely <parrot' Mr. Lucurell's disclosure in disclosing Mr. 
Underdown to support a contention of the two experts being "exactly" the same is not actually 
borne out by Mr. Underdown's report. In addition to subjects that are not even addressed in Mr. 
Underdown's report (e.g., "the reasonableness of Hartford refusing to deal with Adjuster's 
International"). Mr. Underdown's report highlights subject areas that go well beyond that 
identified by Mr. Lucurell, and likely well beyond what Mr. Lucurell would be qualified to 
testify about, such as: 1) whether Lakeland complied with its duties under the policy (p. 2); 2) 
whether or not Hartford complied with the Idaho Unfair Claim Settlement Practices statute (p. 
3); 3) whether or not Hartford attempted «in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair and equitable 
settlement even though the liability for the loss of business income was clear" (p. 3); 4) whether 
inventory should have been completed at the time of salvage (p. 3); 5) whether the claim was 
"mishandled" by Hartford (p. 4); 6) whether Lakeland provided adequate inventory and 
accounting information for Hartford to make regular payments (p. 4); 7) whether Lakeland 
suffered "severe financial distress" as a result of the claims process; and 8) whether "Hartford's 
actions fell substantially and grossly below the standard of care for insurance companies 
handling loss of business income claims." (p' 5). Thus, the opinions anticipated to be offered by 
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Mr. Underdown - especially with respect to policy interpretation and bad faith-related issues3 -
expand significant beyond that disclosed with respect to Mr. Lucurell.4 Thus, again, Hartford is 
prejudiced by not being afforded the full opportunity contemplated by the Scheduling Order to 
review and identify a responsive expert to address such potential testimony. 
Further, given the March 22, 2010 trial date in this matter, a resetting of the expert 
disclosure deadlines is impractical, and would only serve to further prejudice Hartford, who 
would have to locate, retain, and prepare a new expert for trial in a very compressed time frame, 
not only potentially impacting the qualify of Hartford's expert's testimony, but also impairing 
Hartford's pre-trial preparation activities. Additionally, although plaintiff may propose a 
rescheduling of trial to allow for additional expert-related activities in the case, Hartford wishes 
to proceed to trial on March 22, 2010, as scheduled, and plaintiff should not otherwise be 
rewarded for its dilatory conduct. Accord, Siegel, 137 Idaho at 543 ("As the State points out, 
requiring a continuance whenever the defense discloses evidence on the first day of trial would 
effectively allow defendants to avoid trial indefinitely and would provide Uttle incentive for 
defendants to comply with discovery rules.") 
Thus, the disclosure of Mr. Underdown should be stricken, as it is untimely. Further, 
such untimely disclosure has caused Hartford prejudice. Accordingly, this Court should deny 
plaintiff's Motion, and strike plaintiff's disclosure of Mr. Underdown, so a to preclude him from 
testifying at the trial of this matter. 
C. Mr. Underdown, Mr. Lucurell, and Mr. Harper's anticipated testimony has been rendered 
irrelevant, in whole or in part, bascd upon this Court's summary judgment ruling 
Even were this Court to find that plaintiff is excused from complying with the Court's 
3 Which are otherwise inadmissible, as discussed below. 
4 Note that, to date, Mr. Lucurell has apparently not generated any report, formulated any opinions, or otherwise 
reviewed any documents in connection with this matter. See Counsel Aff., Exh. F. 
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pre-trial order with respect to the untimely disclosure of Mr. Underdown, the scope of Mr. 
Underdown's testimony still demonstrates a need to deny plaintiff'S Motion and strike his 
designation. In ruling on Hartford's summary judgment motion, the Court rejected plaintiffs' 
bad faith c1aims, limiting the dispute in this action to "plaintiff's claim for breach of contract as 
relating to Hartford's determination of the dates of the 'Period of Restoration' at issue in this 
matter." (MSJ Order at 2.) The Policy provision at issue relating to the end date of the Period of 
Restoration provides that the Period of Restoration: 
Ends on the date when: 
(1) The property at the "scheduled premises" should be 
repaired, rebuilt, or rep/aced with reasonable speed and similar 
quality; ... 
(Affidavit ofMelarrie Copley, filed August 20, 2009, Exh. A, at H 419.) This is especially true 
in light of the Court's comments from the bench at the time of summary judgment arguments on 
November 4, 2009, wherein the Court recognized the 'fairly debatable' nature of the claim 
dispute between the parties. Despite this, plaintiffs' proposed testimony of Mr. Underdown is 
intended to address the reasonableness of Hartford's conduct during the claim: 
(b) Mr. Underdown will testify as to whether the practices engaged in by 
Defendant's adjusters was reasonable, including but not limited to 1) the 
reasonab1eness of making partial payment towards damaged inventory 2) the 
reasonableness of Hartford's delay in evaluating the inventory 3) the 
reasonableness of Hartford refusing to deal with Adjuster's International, 4) the 
reasonableness of requesting purchasing invoices, bank statements canceled 
checks and other information and 5) the reasonableness of withholding payment 
pending receipt of documentation from the insured in light of the fact that the 
policy in question does not authorize that conduct. 
(ld. at Exh. E, p. 3)(emphasis added). Of course, as discussed above, this doesn't even correctly 
describe the scope of opinions within Mr. Underdown's report, which actually addresses a 
broader range of issues squarely aimed at claims of bad faith, including: 1) whether Lakeland 
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complied with its duties under the policy (p. 2); 2) whether or not Hartford complied with the 
Idaho Unfair Claim Settlement Practices statute (p. 3); 3) whether or not Hartford attempted "in 
good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair and equitable settlement even though the liability for the 
loss of business income was clear" (p. 3); 4) whether inventory should have been completed at 
the time of salvage (p. 3); 5) whether the claim was "mishandled" by Hartford (p. 4); 6) whether 
Lakeland provided adequate inventory and accounting information for Hartford to make regular 
payments (p. 4); 7) whether Lakeland suffered "severe fmancial distress" as a result of the claims 
process; and 8) whether "Hartford's actions fell substantially and grossly below the standard of 
care for insurance companies handling loss of business income claims." (p. 5). In fact, Mr. 
Underdown's report is wholly devoid of any contention that the selected Period of Restoration is 
incorrect, or otherwise that Lakeland would have been unable to resume operations by October 
3],2008. As none of Mr. Underdown's identified scope of testimony addressed the remaining 
issue in litigation, the designation of Mr. Underdown should be stricken (if not otherwise 
stricken for being untimely). 
As such, this Court should deny plaintiff's Motion and strike the designation of Mr. 
Underdown. 
CONCLUSION 
As such, this Court should deny plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Pretrial Order. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ,{'day ofJanuary, 2010. 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the '5!:. day of January, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the 
following: 
Arthur M. Bistline 
Law Offices of Arthur M. Bistline 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83814 
Fax: 208/665-7290 
o U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
o Hand Delivered 
rg] Overnight Mail 
o Telecopy 
rg] Email 
/ 
HARTFORD'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM PRETRIAL ORDER-11 
0011 
.. --- -
May.la. 2010 7:30AM FRIEDLANDER HAYNES MITCHELL STOW 
--Keely R Duke -
ISB #6044;kcd®hallfiu-leycom 
- Sryan A. Nickels 
_ ISB #6432; ban@ha1l1arley.com 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR mE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE. Case No. CV ~08-7069 
LLC. 
Plain": # 
.w.J.L., ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
vs 
THE HARTFORD FIRE lNSURANCE 
COMPANY. a Connecticut corporation, 
Defendant. 
BASED UPON written motion and argument thereon, and for the re-dsons as stated pn the 
~rd at the rim~ ofthe hearing held on January 13, 2010. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration. filed December 
.15.2009, is DENIBD. 
- IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
County of KOOTENAJ j"'" 
FIlED Ip- tr'd- -0'1 
~BK. DIST OURT eputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OP KOOTENAI 
) 
LAKELAND TRUE VAlUE HARDWARE, } 
LlC, } 
) 
. Plaintiff, ) 
V$. ) 
) 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY, ) 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to IRCP 161T IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
Case No. CV 2008 7069 
SCHEDULING 'ORDER, NOTICE 
OF TRIAL SETTING AND INITIAL 
PRETRIAL ORDER 
1. A JURY triaJ for 10 day(s) will commence at the KOOTENAI County Courthouse 
at 9:00 a.m. on MARCH. 22, 2010. If possible, cases SQt for the same day will be tried 
on a to follow basis. 
2. The Court, at ·its discretion, will set the prIority for each of the cMf matters set 
for trial.on the above date. Any party may request a priority setting by filing a request 
for Priority Setting, copy to the Court in chambers. The COurt will attempt to give 
priority to cases where such Request for Priority Setting Is filed in the order in which 
they are filed. Prior participation in mediation is a factor in granting priority. Notice is 
hereby given that all civil trial settings are subject to being preempted by the 
court"s criminal calendar. 
,:. 
E~ 
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In order to assist with the pretrial conference and blal of this matter JT IS HEREBY 
FURll-IER ORDERED that 
1. a. PRETRIAL EVENTS: Before noticing a deposltlon. hearing or other pretrial 
event, a lawyer should consult and work with opposing counsel to accommodate the 
needs and reasonable requests of all witnesses and participating lawyers • 
. b. MOTION PRACTICE: Before setting a motion for a hearing. a lawyer should 
make a reasonable effort to resorv~ the issue without involving the Court. A lawyer who 
has no valid objection to an opponenfs proposed motion should promptly make this 
position known to opposing counsel. Mer a hearing, a laWyer Qharged with preparing the 
proposed order should draft it promptfy, striving to fairly and accurately articulate the 
Court's ruling. Before submitting 'the proposed order to the Court, the lawyer should 
, provide a copy to opposing counsel who should promptly voice any objections. If the 
lawyers cannot resolve aU objections, the draftlng lawyer should promptly submit the 
proposed order to the Court, stating any unresolved objections. 
c. PRETRIAL MOTIONS: Motions for summary judgment shall be timely filed 
So as to be heard not later than ninety (gO} days before trial. The last day for filing all 
other pretrial motions shaJl be twenty-o~ (21) days before trial. except for motions 7n 
limine concerning witnesses and exhibits designated pursuant to paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 
respectively of this Pretrial Order. Motions In Omine concerning designated witnesses and 
exhibits shalf be submitted in writing at least seven (7) days before trial. Motions in 
limine concerning any designated exhibit shall attach copies of the exhibit In issue. 
Motions In limine regarding designated witnesses shall attach copies of the disco'{ery 
. requests claimed to require the earlier disclosure and a representation by counsel 
regarding the absence of a prior response from the party to whom the discovery was 
0017 , 
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directed. The fact that a party which has submitted discovery to another party has not 
filed motions to compel in advance of trial does not, in and of itself, waive an objection by 
"that party as to the timeliness of disclosure of witnesses and exhibits by the other party as 
required by this order. 
2, MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: There shall be served and flied with 
each motion for summary judgment a separate concise statement, together with a 
.reference to the record, of each of the materiaf facts as to which the moving party 
"contends there are no genuine issues of dispute. Any party opposing the motion shall. 
not later thEln fourteen (14) days prior to the date of the hearing, serve and file a 
. separate concise statement, together with a reference to the record, setting forth all 
material facts as to whIch it Is contended there exist genuine issues necessary to be 
litigated. In determining any motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that 
the facts as claimed by the movIng party are admitted to exist without controversy, except 
and to the extent that such facts are asserted to be actually in good faith controverted by 
a statement filed In opposition to the motion. 
3. BRIEFS AND MEMORANDA: In addition to any original brief or memorandum 
tiled with the Clerk of the Court, a chambers' copy shall be provided to the Court. To the 
extent oounsel rely on legal authorities not contained In the Idaho Reports, a copy of 
each case or authority cited shall be attached to the Court's copy of the brief or 
memorandum. 
" 4. DISCOVERY DISPUTES: Unless otherwise oroered. the Court will not entertain 
. . 
any discovery motion, except those brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(c) by a person who is 
not a partY. unless counsel for the moving party tiles with the Court, at the time of filing 
the motion, a certification that the lawyer making the motion has in good faith conferred or 
i' 
I" 
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attempted to confer with the opposing lawyer to reach agreement without court adlon, 
" 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2). The motion shall not refer the Court to other documents in 
the file. For example. if the sufficiency of an answer to an interrogatory Is in issue, the 
motion shall contain, verbatim, both the interrogatory and the allegedly insufficient 
',answer. foJrowed by each party"s contentions; separately stated. In the absence of a 
showing of good cause as to why the discovery was not Initiated so that timely responses 
were due at least thirty (30) days before trial, the Court will not hear motions to compel 
discovery after twenty-one (21) days before trial. 
'5. EXPERT WITNESSES: Not Jater than one hundred eighty (180) days before 
trlaJ, plaintiff(s) shall disclose all experts to be caUed at trial. Not later than one hundred 
fifty (150) days before trial. defendant(s) shall disclose all experts to be caned at trial. 
Such disclosure shall consist of at least the subject matter upon which the expert is 
expected to testify and the SUbstance of any opinions to whfch the expert is expected to 
testify. The disclosure shall be contemporaneously flied with the Court. 
Each party shall, at least tvirenty-eight (28) days before trial, file with the Court , 
, 
and serve all parties with a supplemental disclosure for each expert witness which shalf 
identify the underlying facts and data upon which the opinions of each expert are based, 
, to the extent such information is required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
26(b)(4)(A}(i). Absent good cause, an expert may not testIfy to matiers not included in 
the disclosure. A party may comply with the disclosure by referencing expert witness 
depositions. Without restating the deposition testimony In the disclosure report. 
6: DISCLOSURE OF WITNESSES: Each party shall prepare and exchange 
between the parties and file with the Clerk at least fourteen (14) days before trial a list 
of witnesses with cUlTent addresses and telephone numbers, setting forth a brief 
0019 ~, 
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statement Identifying the general subject matter about which the witness may be asked to 
testify (exclusive of Impeachment witnesses). Each party shall provide opposing parties 
with a list of the party's witnesses and shall provide the Court with two copies of each list 
'of witnesses. 
7. EXHIBITS AND -EXHIBIT LISTS: Using the attached form, each party shall 
prepare a list of exhibits it expects to offer. Exhibits should be listed In the order that the 
party anticipates they will be offered. Each party shall affIX labels to their exhibits before 
mal. After the labels are marked and attached to the Original exhibit, copies should be 
made. Plaintiffs exhibits shalf be marked In numerical sequence. Defendanfs exhibits 
shall be marked In alphabetical sequence. The civil action number of the case and the 
date of the trial shall also be placed on each of the exhibit labels. Exhibit lists and copies 
of &xhibits shalf be exchanged between parties and the exhibit list 'filed with the Clerk at 
least fourteen {14} days before trial. The original exhibits and a Judge'S copy of the 
exhibits should be filed with the Clerk at the time of trial. Two copies of the exhibit Jist are 
to be fDed with the Clerk. It Is expected that each party will have a copy of all exhibits to 
be used at trial. 
" 8. JURY INSTRUCTIONS: Jury instructions shall be prepared and exchanged 
between the parties and filed with the Clerk (with copies delivered to chambers) at feast 
s~ven (1) days before trial. The Court has prepared stock instructions covering the 
following Idaho Jury Instructiol1S: 1.00, 1.01, 1.03, 1.03.1,1.04,1.05,1.09.1.11.1.13, 
1.13.1, 1.15.2. 1.20.1, 1.22. 124.1 and 9.00. Copies of the Court's stock Instructions 
'may be obtained from the Court, and are available on the Kootenai County website 
(www.co.kootenai.ld.us/dpQcn1.rnentldistrJctcourVfonpslasp)1 The parties shall meet In 
good faith to agree on a statement of claims Instruction whfch shan be submitted to the 
..... _- ............. - -- ... -- .... _--- --_ ..... --_ .. - -
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Court with the other proposed Instructions. Absent agreement, each party shall submit 
their own statement of claims instruction. All instructions shall be prepared in 
accordance with I.RC.P. 51(a). A party objecting to any requested Jury Instruction shall 
file at the time of trial written objections to jury Instructions. 
9. TRfAL BRIEFS: Trial briefs shall be prepared and exchanged between the 
. parties and flied with the Clerk (with copies to chambers) at least seven (7) days before 
trIal. 
10. PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: If the trial is to the Court, each 
party Shall at least seven (7) days prior to trial 11la with the opposing parties and the 
Court (with copies to chambers) proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
supporting their position. 
11. TRIAL PRACTICE: At least a week before trial the lawyers shall meet and 
confer to discuss any stipulations that can be made at the beginning of trial and what 
exhIbits can be admitted by stipulation.. Following this meeting, the parties shall 
Immediately alert the Court to any matters that need to be taken up before the time 
scheduled for trial to begin. 
. '. 
• 12. TRIAL DAY; After the first day of trial, all subsequent trial days wDllikefy be on 
an 8:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. schedule. 
13. MODIFICATION: This Pretrial Order may be modified by stipulatron of the 
parnes upon entry of an order by the Court approving such stipulation. Any party may. 
upon motion and for good cause shown, seek leave of the Court modifying the terms of 
this order, upon such terms and conditions as the Court deems fit. Any party may 
request a pretrial conference pursuant to U~"C.P. 16 or mediation pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
16(k). 
0021 
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14. REQUEST TO VACATE TRIAL SETIlNG: Any party moving or stipulating to 
vacate a trial setting shall set forth the reasons for the reql,lest and incJude a 
representation by counsel that these reasons have been dlscu~sed wIth the client and 
that the client has no objection to vacating the trial date. For a continuance to be granted, 
the parties shall have already engaged in mediation, or shouJd expect to engage in 
mediation at the time originally set for the trial or shortly thereafter. 
Any vacation or continuance of the trial day shall not change or alter the tim~ frames 
for the deadlines set forth herein, but the dates for such deadHnes will change to the new 
dates as are established by the date of the new trial setting. Any party may, upon motion 
and for good cause shown, request different discovery and disclosure dates upon 
vacation or continuance of the trial date. 
15. MEDIATION; Lawyers should educate their cJfents early in the legal process 
about the varIous methods of resolving disputes without trial, including mediation, 
arbitration arid neutral case evaluation. The parties are encouraged and expected to 
mediate as soon as possiple. The Court will facilitate mediation if requested. The parties 
~re ordered to report joinHy to the cOurt in writlng at Jeast sixty (60) days prior to trial, 
~tting forth when mediation occurred and the resolts of mediation. If no mediation has 
taken place. the joint report must state the reason the parties are not using mediation. 
16. SANCTIONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE: Fairure to timely comply in all 
respects with the provisions of this order shall SUbject noncomplying parties to sanctions 
. pursuant to I.R-C.P. Rule 16(i). which may include: 
(A) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose 
designated claims or defenses. or prohibiting such party from IntrodUcing designated 
matters in evidence; 
0022 j: 
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(8) An order strtking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further 
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part 
thereof. or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
(C) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order treating 
as contempt of court the failure to comply; 
(D) In lieu of or In addition to any other sanction, the judge shall require the 
. . 
party or the attorney representing such party or both to pay the reasonable expenses 
. incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule. Including attomey's fees, unless 
the judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
IT JS FURTHER ORDERED that no party may rely upon any deadUne set forth in 
this pretrial order as a reason for failing to timely respond to discovery or to timely 
supplement discovery responses pursuant to I.R.CP. 26(c). 
Notice is hereby glve~, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(1 )(G), that 
an altemate judge may be assigned to preside in this case. The following is a list of 
potential alternate judges: Han. James R Michaud, Han. John P. Luster, Han. Fred 
Gibler, Hon. Charles W. Hosack, Hon. Steve Verbyor Hon. George R. Reinhardt, III or 
. Han. lanSing L Haynes. 
Unless a party.has previously exercised their right to disqualification without cause 
under Rule 40(d)(1), each party shan have the right to file one (1) motion for 
disqualification without cause as to any alternate judge not later than ten (10) days after 
saNlce of this notice. 
. 0023 ;. 
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JT IS FURTH~ ORDERED that any party who brings in an additional party shal! 
serve a copy of this tlSchedu6ng Order, Notice of Trial Setting" upon that added party at 
the time the pleading adding the party is served on the added party. and proof of such 
service shall then be given to the Court by the party adding an additionaJ party. 
DATED this ~ fA, day of June, 2009. 
BY ORDER OFJOHN T. MITCHELL, District Judge 
Jear;;A~~~~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAlUNG 
I ~ certify that true copies ofibe foregoing have baen mailed. postage prepaid or sent by Interoffice maU, 
this 2t£: day of Juno. 2009. to: If applicabl6, KOOTENAICounfy JUlY Commissioner, Judge Giblet. Judge Hosack, 
Ti'IaI Court Ad'minislraior • 
Arlhur BlsUine 
5431 N. ~vemment Way, Ste 
101A 
'Coeur d'Alene,lD 83816 
F-1A'f.. (g b5 - 7;? <Jo 
KeeIyE. Duke 
P.O. Sox 1271 
. Boise, ro 83701 
~ ~O?~ 39S-!f5fS 
. .~~t4«1td 
. e Clausen" Depuo/ CleJkfSecretary 
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LIST OF EXHIBITS 
CASE NUMBER ______ ~-- DATE' 
-----
Tm..:! OF CASE _________ V. __________ --
o 
o 
o 
PUltrnFF'S EXHIBITS (Ust numerically) 
DEFENDANT'S ExJiISlTS (list alphabetically) 
THIRD PARTY ExHlsrrs STA~PARTY ____ ~ ____________ __ 
:,< 
II Iii 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE, ) 
LLC, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON 
APPEAL 
Supreme Court Docket No. 37987-2010 
Kootenai County Docket No. 2008-7069 
A MOTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL was filed by counsel for 
Appellant on March 28,2011. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MUTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S 
RECORD ON APPEAL be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include 
the documents listed below, file stamped copies of which acc0mpanied this Motion: 
1. Plaintiffs Expert Witness Disclosure, file-stamped September 24,2009; 
2. Motion for Relief from Pretrial Order, file-stamped November 16, 2009; 
3. Defendant's Motion in Limine re: Damages, file-stamped February 9, 2010; 
4. Plaintiffs Notice of Filing Proposed Jury Instructions, file-stamped March 15,2010; 
5. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Continue, file-stamped March 19,2010; 
6. Affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline in Support of Motion to Continue with attachments, file-
stamped March 19,2010; 
7. Plaintiff s Motion to Continue Trial, file-stamped March 19, 2010; 
8. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Dismissal of Plaintiffs 
Bad Faith Claims, file-stamped April 6, 2010; 
9. Plaintiffs Objections to Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions, file-stamped May 26, 
2010; 
10. Plaintiffs Objections to and Proposed Special Verdict Form, receive-stamped May 26, 
2010; 
11. Jury Instructions Given, file-stamped May 28, 2010; 
12. Special Verdict, file-stamped May 28, 2010; and 
13. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure, file-stamped November 4,2009. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL - Docket No. 
37987-2010 
II 
f! 
DATED this I day of 2011. 
For the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
cc: Counsel of Record 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL - Docket No. 
37987-2010 
~ 09-24- ' 09 09:29 FROM-Ko i Dist Court T-850 P001/001 F-5 
- - t ::.. _ . - - - - . 
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III 
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
LA W OFFICE OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 665-7270 
(208) 665-7290 (fax) 
abistline@povn.com 
ISB: 5216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
~mTENN}SS 
FlED: 
2009 SEP 24 AM 9: 00 
CLERK OlSlRICT COURT 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRl¢T OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOqTENAI 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE, 
L.L.e., 
Plaintiff, 
YS. 
THE HARTFORD, a Connecticut corpora.tion, 
Defendant. 
Case No: CV08-7069 
LAlNTIFF'S EXP~R:r WITNESS 
ISCLOSURE . 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, LAKELAND TRUE V ALUE HARDWARE, L.L.C .• by and 
through its Attorney of Record, ARTHUR M. BISTLlNE, and hereby, di~closes the followlng 
expert witnesses to be called to testity at the time of trial as follows: 
1. Dan Harpet, CPAIABV, ASA, MBA 
Harper Incorporated 
601 West Main Ave., Ste. 814 
Spokane, W A 9920 t 
(509) 747·5850 
Mr. Harper will testify to his findings as set forth in hi* affidavit of September 4, 
2009, attached hereto. In addition, Mr. Harper may provide testimony to provide insight into 
the cash flow problems caused by Defendant's failure to timely pay Plaintiff's claim as well 
as to the reasonableness of withholding payment on a claim such as this pending receipt of 
information. Mr. Harper will testity regarding accounting prjncip~es and definitions and 
reasonable means and methods by which to calculate a loss such as Plaintiff's. Mr. Harp~r 
may testify to the actual increased expenses incurrc=d by Lakeland iTrue Value hardware 
In addition, Mr. Harper will testify regarding the continuing business income 10ss 
sustained by Plaintiff after the contract coverage of one year had ~xpired. 
PLAINTIFf'S eXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURH • 1 
R. 3rd Adden. 
01 
2. Drew Lucurell, Esq.; SPPA 
Adjusters International 
305 E. Pine Street 
Seattle, W A 98122 
(206) 682-0595 
Mr. Lucurell will testify as to whether the practices engaged in by Defendant's 
adjusters was reasonable, including but not limited to 1) the reasonableness of making partial 
payment towards damaged inventory 2) the reasonableness of imposing GAAP accounting 
principles when interpreting a policy that does not set forth the GAAP is applicable 3) the 
reasonableness of Hartford's delay in evaluating the inventory 4) the reasonableness of 
Hartford refusing to deal with Adjuster's International, 5) the reasonableness of requesting 
purchase invoices, bank statements, canceled checks and other information and 6) the 
reasonableness of withholding payment pending receipt of documentation from the insured in 
light of the fact that the policy in question does not authorize that conduct. 
Mike and/or Kathy Fritz may testify regarding the good wi11 of a hard were store 
and how to maintain that good will as well as to the business practices of True Value. 
Plaintiff reserves the right to name additional expert witnesses named by defendant 
and/or rebuttal experts and/or any other experts as may be deemed necessary by information 
obtained through ongoing discovery. 
DATED this 23 rd day of September, 2009. 
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
PLAINTlFF'S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE - 2 
R. 3rd Addeo. 
02 
CERJIFICATE OF SERVICE 
];7~' 
I hereby certify that on the ~ay of September, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
conect copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Keely E. Duke 
Bryan A. Nickels 
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. 
PO Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701-1271 
FAX: (208) 395-8585 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE - 3 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
'K [ J 
Hand -del i vered 
Regular mail 
Certified mail 
Overnight mail 
Facsimile 
Interoffice Mail 
R. 3rd Adden. 
03 
11-16-'09 17:48 FROM 
ARTIlUR M. BISTLINE 
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur dtAlene, ID 83814 
(208) 665-7270 
(208) 665-7290 (fax) 
abistline@povn.oom 
ISB: 5216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
i Dist Court T-360 P001/002 F-398 
STAlE Of !(1A!{) } SS 
COUNTY Qt !(C(\TENN 
AlEO' 
1iln~ mw 16 PI" 4: 40 
GLEfn< D~STRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAl 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDW ARE5 
L.L.C .• 
Plaintiff. 
\'S. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY. a Connecticut COIpOl'atio~ 
Defendant. 
OTION FOR RELIEF FROM PRETRIAL 
RDER 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff. LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE. L.L.C., by and 
through its Attorney of Record, ARTHUR M. BISTLINE. and moves this Court for an Order for 
Relief from Pretrial Order. 
This motion is based upon Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16, the affidavit of Arthur M. 
Bistline and the memorandum in support filed herewith. 
Oral argwnent is requested on this motion. 
DATEDthis 16th day of Nov em bet, 2009. 
~c ____ -----'~-------_____ 
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
MOTION FOk. RELIEF FROM PRETRIAL ORDER 
- 1 
R. 3 rd Adden. 
04 
, t 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
.. ,J'tl \ j A :.-~ 
I hereby certify that on the \\.,1L day of November, 2009, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Keely E. Duke 
Bryan A. Nickels 
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. 
PO Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701-1271 
FAX: (208) 395-8585 
[ J 
[ ] [ L 
.{tl (] 
Hand-delivered 
Regular mail 
Certified mail 
Facsimile 
Email 
l ." ,
\~'~? 
B Y~---'-_~";:;;:_;....l.·'i----=w::'::':":~""'''''L:r''''''('-+./d~«_'~''_;.L; _'--'\";"--_ 
'JENNIFER HOS~S '.-- ) 
c. 
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM PRETRlAL ORDER 
-2 
R. 3rd Adden. 
05 
. ~... '; 
STATE Of /O.\HO ! 
COUNiY OFtiOOf£HAff 5S FIUD: . 
Keely E. Duke 20m fEB -9 AM 8: 06 
ISH #6044; ked@ha11fiJ:rley.com 
. Bryan A. Nickels 
ISH #6432; ban@hallfmley.com. 
. RK OI.STRt~~r 
HALL, FARLEY, OBBRRECHr & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho~ Suite 700 
!lTy ~ 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (20S) 395-8500 
F~: (208)395-8585 
W:\3\347U\MIUMD.. • Consequential J::la!wtscs. MotiOll.doo 
Attomeys for Defendant 
IN nlEDISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICf OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIlE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
f LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE, 
L.L.C.~ 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation. 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-08-7069 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
DAMAGES 
. COMES NOW, defendant Hartford Fire· Insurance Company ("Hartford"), by and 
through its counsel of record Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & BJ.an1nn" P.A., and hereby moves this 
Court for an Order precluding plaintiff Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC's r'Lakeland") 
claims, if any, for (1) consequential damages for any alleged bll*b o.f contract by Hartford, at 
the trial of this matter set for March 22, 2010. (2) damages for time periods beyond the time 
. period of November 1, 2008 through January 28, 2009 actually at issue in this action, and (3) 
expenses and damages that are either personal to the owners of Lakeland, Michael and Kathy 
......... 
R. 3rd Adden. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES - I 06 
Fritz (collectively referred to as the "Fritzes"), were previously paid by Hartford, or are in excess 
of the Policy limits. 
This motion is supported by Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine 
Re: Damages, and the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine Re: 
Damages, both of which are filed herewith. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this B~ay of February, 2010. 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & 
BLANTON, P.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the at!:: day of February, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
the following: 
Arthur M. Bistline 
Law Offices of Arthur M. Bistline 
1423 N. Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Fax: 208/665-7290 
D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
WOvernight Mail 
D Telecopy. 
V (folrt: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES - 2 
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ARTIIUR M. BISTLINE 
BISn.1NE LAW. PLLC 
1423 N Government Way 
Coeur d·A1ene~ ID 83814 
(208) 665-7270 
(208) 665-7290 (fax) 
abisJlinS;@povn.com 
IS8: 5216 
Attorney foe Plaintiff 
- - - - - --. --- -
STAfF. OF :U/'-J-IO } SS 
COUN.TI/ ('!F 11t'V'iyr-h.:{,! 1 ·1, .! 'J..,\. 1_' " ' 
FILED: 
iGIP ,j\R 15 PN 4: 3!, 
CLr:.MI< DiSTRiCT COURT 
DEPt rt,{---~----
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDIC DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,IN AND FOR THE COUNIOF KOOTENAI 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE, 
L.L.C .• 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a COlUlccticut Corporation, 
Defendant. 
i 
ase No.: CV.08-7069 
LAINTlFP'S NOTICE OF FILING 
ROPOSED JURy INSTRUCTIONS 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE, L.L.C., by and 
through its undersigned. counsel, Arthut M, Bistline, and gives notice ~ffuing its proposedjury 
instructions attached as Exhibit A. The Court's stock civil jury instrucpons are also acceptable 
to P1aintiff. 
DATED this 15th~ day of March. 2010, 
Pl.ArNTrFF'S NOnc.R OF Fll.lNO 
AR~. BrS~LINE 
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,J\V" 
I hereby certify that on the I'""~:) "'day of March) 2010, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Keely E, Duke 
Bryan A. Nickels 
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701 
P1,AINTIFF'S NOTICE OF FTI.1NG 
US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
t"::;Pacsimile (208) 395-8585 
Email 
/ 
. I 
i / 
t/ 
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, , 
Plaintiff's proposed 
INSTRUCTION NO.1 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following 
propositions: 
1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant; 
2. The defendant breached the contract; 
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each 
of the propositions required of the plaintiff has been proved, then you 
must consider the issue of the affirmative defenses raised by the 
defendant, and explained in the next instruction. If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions in this 
instruction has not been proved, your verdict should be for the 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
defendant. 
R. 3rd Adden. 
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Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
Plaintiff's proposed 
INSTRUCTION NO.2 
You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the 
contract offered by any witness, or any oral agreement of the parties 
occurring before execution of the written agreement, which is 
inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written agreement. 
While you may consider the testimony of witnesses if necessary to 
clarify an ambiguity, you may not consider such testimony to completely 
change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in such a 
fashion that it no longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or 
parts. 
R. 3rd Adden. 
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Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
Plaintiffs proposed 
INSTRUCTION NO.3 
A "material breach of contract," as that term is used in these 
instructions, means a breach that defeats a fundamental purpose of the 
contract. 
R. 3rd Adden. 
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Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
Plaintiff's proposed 
INSTRUCTION NO.4 
Where a contract does not specify a time for performance, the 
law will imply a requirement that it be performed within a reasonable 
time, as is determined by the subject matter of the contract, the 
situation of the parties, and the nature of the performance required. In 
such case, it is for the jury to determine what a reasonable time would 
be under the circumstances, given all of the evidence in the case. 
R. 3rd Addeo. 
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Plaintiff's Proposed 
INSTRUCTION NO.5 
The defendant has asserted the defense of prevention of performance. The 
defendant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff unreasonably prevented or 
substantially hindered the defendant's performance of the contract. If this 
affirmative defense is proved, the defendant is excused from performance. 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following 
propositions: 
1. A contract existed between plaintiff and defendant; 
2. The defendant breached the contract; 
3. The plaintiff has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each 
of the propositions required of the plaintiff has been proved, then you 
must consider the issue of the affirmative defenses raised by the 
defendant, and explained in the next instruction. If you fmd from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions in this 
instruction has not been proved, your verdict should be for the 
defendant. 
R. 3rd Adden. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
You may not consider any explanation or interpretation of the 
contract offered by any witness, or any oral agreement of the parties 
occurring before execution of the written agreement, which is 
inconsistent with the plain, ordinary meaning of the written agreement. 
While you may consider the testimony of witnesses if necessary to 
clarii)' an ambiguity, you may not consider such testimony to completely 
change the agreement, or to construe a term of the agreement in such a 
fashion that it no longer fits with the other, non-ambiguous terms or 
parts. 
R. 3rd Adden. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
A "material breach of contract," as that term is used in these 
instructions, means a breach that defeats a fundamental purpose of the 
contract. 
R. 3rd Adden. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Where a contract does not specify a time for performance, the 
law will imply a requirement that it be performed within a reasonable 
time, as is determined by the subject matter of the contract, the 
situation of the parties, and the nature of the performance required. In 
such case, it is for the jury to determine what a reasonable time would 
be under the circumstances, given all of the evidence in the case. 
R. 3rd AddeD. 
018 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The defendant has asserted the defense of prevention of performance. The 
defendant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff unreasonably prevented or 
substantially hindered the defendant's performance of the contract. If this 
affirmative defense is proved, the defendant is excused from performance. 
R. 3rd Adden. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICr DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIlE COUNT OF KOOTENAI 
I 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE, 
L.L.C.; 
! 
i 
! 
ase No.: CV-08-7069 
Plaintiff, 
EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
o CONTINUE 
YS. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation. 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff seeks a contmuance on the grounds that Dan Harper,IPlainliffs expert and most 
important witness, has long standing vacation plans during the present trial setting. Defendant 
suggests that Plaintiff preserve Mr. Harper's testimony by video deposition and Plaintiff objects. 
Such a presentation by the most important witness in Plaintiff's case is unacceptable, but more 
imporlantly~ deprives Plaintiff of the ability to rebut the trial testimo~y ofDefendanCs expert 
witnesses. 
Plaintiff is the party seeking compensation from this CQurt and is the party with the 
greatest interest in resolving this matter sooner rather than laler. Hanford is earning interest on 
its money every day that it does not have to pay it out. Counsel for Plaintiff has discussed this 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPOR.T OFMOTION TO CON'l'INUB 
- ~.-- ----
- 1 
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continuance request with Plaintiff and Plaintiff concurs that it is in Plaintiff's best interest to 
have Mr. Harper testify live, and to be able to provide rebuttal testimony. 
A request to grant or deny a continuance is within the discretion of the trial Court. Werry 
v. Phillips Petroleum Co. 97 Idaho 130, 137,540 P.2d 792, 799 (1975). When an affidavit 
requesting a continuance meets certain criteria, however, it is error to deny the continuance. Id. 
Those criteria here are present because there is no way to secure the rebuttal testimony of Dan 
Harper prior to trial and that rebuttal will be crucial to Plaintiff's case. 
From the foregoing cases it appears that if the showing made upon 
an application for a continuance upon the ground of the absence of 
a material witness, is made in good faith, shows that reasonable 
diligence has been exercised to obtain the presence of the witness, 
shows substantially to what the witness would testify and that such 
testimony is material, and shows a sufficient reason for the absence 
of the witness by the affidavit of an affiant in position to know the 
facts, then it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to 
grant a continuance. 
Pauley v. Salmon River Lumber Co. 
74 Idaho 483, 490, 264 P.2d 466, 
470 (.1953) 
While in this case, Mr. Harper could be deposed and his testimony preserved for trial, Lakeland 
has no way to preserve his rebuttal testimony nor to compel his attendance at this trial to 
preserve his ability to provide rebuttal testimony. There is no reasonable amount of diligence 
that can secure this witness for trial. 
Lakeland's theory is that the contract for insurance provides for a series of payments 
during the period of restoration based on the language in the contract that says "We will pav for 
the actual 1 ass of Business Income you sustain due to the necessary suspension of your 
"operations" during the period of restoration.'" There is no debate that the policy required a 
I Affidavit of Copley filed in support of motion for summary judgment, H405, pp o. (1). on that page of the policy. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OFMOTION TO CONTINUE 
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series of payments. Hartford withheld certain installments of this series of payments and the 
entire premise of Hartford's justification for doing so is that the aCCOtmtants did not have all the 
infoll11ation those accountants required to make the necessary calculations to provide timely 
payments to Lakeland.2 
By Mr. Bistline to Ms. Reynolds, the supervising adiuster: 
Q. And why hadn't a payment been made for those months? 
A. Lack of documentation and financial information.3 
However, in deposition, the adjusters involved, Ms. Copley, Ms. Reynolds, and Ms. Kale, could 
not testify what the information was missing and deferred to the accountants. Ms. Copley 
testified: 
Q. Okay. What was missing? 
A. For specific missing information you'd have to go back and talk to MD&D 
[the accountants hired by Hartford].4 
Ms. Kale testified: 
Q. Did -- at some point you received a schedule and you hadn't had it prior to 
that point. Had anybody at your accounting firm told you that we cannot 
generate this schedule because we don't have the information we need? 
A. Amy at Matson & Driscoll [the accountants] had continuously advised that 
we were missing documentation needed to have another schedule.5 
Ms. Reynolds testified: 
Q. The question is what information did you think you were missing at that 
point? 
2 The Hartford is clearly saying the reason that the required series of payments were delayed was because of missing information 
-- not because of the differing demands of Lakeland as this Court has found. 
1 Deposition of Reynolds at 29:20 < 
4 Deposition of Melanie Copley at 12:21 
5 Deposition of Kale 73: 15 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OFMOTION TO CONTINUE 
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A. I'd have to look at that entire file to tell you specifically. I mean, it's 
indicated in the note that we're looking for the insured's cost to replace the 
damaged stock, that had not been received in the file, and to get back with 
our accountants regarding where they stood on their status with their 
nW11bers. 6 
Then later: 
A. The projected numbers are just that, they're just projections. If there was 
additional information that was needed by the accountants to verify those 
numbers, that's what they would have been requesting. 7 
Clearly, the adjusters are alleging that the accountants were the ones claiming to not have 
sufficient information to calculate a payment. Dan Harper, Lakeland's expert, has testified that 
the accountants had everything they needed to make the series of payments and, as will be more 
fully set forth in the memorandum in support of the pending motion for reconsideration, actually 
did calculate those payments.8 As pointed out numerous times before, the record before the 
Court contains not one statement from any of Hartford's accountants as to anything. On 
summary judgment, the accountants did not explain what information they were missing, but 
those accountants wi]] be required to do so at trial since the Hartford is deferring to them to 
explain this to the jury. 
Hartford's accountants are the crux of its entire defense and those accountants have never 
explained what information they were missing. Lakeland certainly has the right to have its 
accountant available to rebut the Hartford's accountant's explanation at trial. The reasonable 
opportunity to present and to rebut evidence has been recognized as fundamental elements of 
procedural due process in a variety of contexts. Gay v. County Com'rs of Bonneville County 103 
Idaho 626, 629, 651 P.2d 560, 563 (Ct.App.1982). See Golay v. Loami, 118 Idaho 387, 398, 
797 P .2d 95, 106 (1990) - " ... opposing party would insist, and rightly so, on being allowed to 
6 D<;:position of R<;:ynoJds at 13 :22 to ! 4:5 
7 Deposition of Reynolds at 15: 1 0 
8 Bales Stamped A1lidavit of Dan Harper filed 2-10-10 at Bales 22 through 24. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OFMOTION TO CONTINUE 
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present rebuttal testimony;" Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 875, 136 P.3d 338, 346 (2006) -
- "The pretrial order and subsequent decision also denied the Edmunds an opportunity to 
respond to or rebut St. Alphonsus1s evidence."; Clarkv. Klein 137 Idaho 154,159,45 PJd 810, 
815 (2002) - "Because this was the first time that this theory was advanced that Corey did not 
have the hole in his intestine at the time of his release, Appellants did not have an opportunity to 
prepare cross-examination or to offer rebuttal testimony." 
Hartford withheld payments it was required to make pursuant to the policy. Hartford has 
premised its defense to this conduct on the fact that its accountants did not have the required 
information to calculate the payments and have deferred to the accountant to explain what 
information was missing to the jury at trial. Lakeland has the right to continue this trial to have 
its accountant available to rebut the Hartford's expert testimony in this regard. 
It is a legal impossibility for Lakeland to secme the presence of this out-of-state witness 
for trial. Lakeland has the right to have its most important witness testify live for this jury and 
will be prejudiced by a video presentation. More importantly, procedural due process requires 
that Lakeland be allowed to rebut the testimony of the Hartford's accountants. Lakeland has 
made the showing required Pauley v. Salmon River Lumber Co. 74 Idaho 483, 490, 264 P.2d 
466, 470 (1953) - it cannot secme the presence of the witness through due diligence and the 
testimony of the witness is materiaL It would an abuse of discretion not to grant the 
continuance. 
DATED this 18t\ day of March, 2010. 
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OFMOTION TO CONTINUE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
'\'" IC1> 
I hereby certify that on the Ll day of March, 2010, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Keely E. Duke 
Bryan A. Nickels 
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
, .. r;:,? Facsimile (208) 395-8585 
, Email 
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ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC 
1423 N Govt:mment Way 
Coeur d'Alene. 10 83814 
(208) 665·7270 
(208) 665 .. 7290 (fax) 
abistline@povn.com 
ISS: 5216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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STATE OF lClAHO } 
COUNT\' C~ ;{OCITf}lA: SS 
FILEO 
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CLERK DiSTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST mDIcJL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
I 
I , 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE, ase No.: CV ·08-7069 
L.L.C., 
FFIDA VIT OF ARTHUR M. BISTUNE IN 
Plaintiff" SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONTINUE 
VS. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Kootenai ) 
I, Arthur M. Bistline. having been first duly sworn, upon oath depose and state that: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
Attached as Exhibit A are true and correct copies of the cited portions of the deposition 
transcript of Melanie Copley. . 
Attached as Exhibit B are true and correct copies of the cited portions of the deposition 
transcript of Michelle Reynolds. 
Attached as Exhibit C are true lIDd correct copies of the cited portions of the deposition 
transcript of Julia Kale. 
Dan Harper is a resident ofthe State of Washington and this CoUrt cannot compel his 
attendance at this trial. •. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF ARTHUR M. BISTLINE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONTINue; • 1 
5) All statements of counsel set forth in the Memorandum in Support of this Motion to 
Continue are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and the entire contents 0 that 
memorandum are incorporated here as if set forth in full. 
DATED this (C,la-ay of March, 2010. 
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
c::·{~) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ITc!9y~pM~rCh, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i/····{/~·· 
I hereby certify that on the t) icray of March, 2010, I served a true and COlTect copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Keely E. Duke 
Bryan A. Nickels 
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701 
US Mail 
__ Ovemight Mail 
J-Iand Deli vered 
·'f/Facsimile (208) 395-8585 
Email 
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Lakeland True Value Hardware. L.L.C. v. The Hartford Fire Insurance Co. CV-08-7069 
Michelle Reynolds March I, 2010 
Page 29 
1 MS. DUKE: Object to the form. I think 
2 that assumes facts not in evidence. 
3 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
4 Q. Okay. Let me just rephrase it. At some 
5 point after I filed suit, did you inform anybody at 
6 Sedgwick and/or Hartford that no business income 
7 payment had been made since -- well, for anything 
8 other than up through the month of June? 
9 MS. DUKE: And again, I'm going to need 
10 you to narrow the time frame because you may be 
11 invading the attorney-client privilege at some 
12 point, obviously. 
13 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
14 Q. Let's just say right after the suit was 
15 filed, before you talked to an attorney, did you 
16 inform anybody at The Hartford, other than your 
17 lawyer, that no business income payment had been 
18 made for July, August or September? 
19 
20 
A. 
Q. 
Personally, no. 
And why hadn't a payment been made for 
21 those months? 
22 A. Lack of documentation and financial 
23 information. 
24 Q. And what documentation was missing? 
25 MS. DUKE: Objection. Foundation. Ye9rd Adden. 
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Page 12 
1 if you reference the claim notes, it looks like 
2 based on this report they authorized another $73,000 
3 in business income, which would be the difference 
4 between 123,951 minus the 50 that has already been 
5 advanced. Does that sound correct? 
6 A. I have a question as to who authorized. 
7 Q. Well, it's in your claim notes that as 
8 soon as they received the second schedule I believe 
9 they would send a request for payment for that 
10 $73,000. 
11 A. All right. 
12 Q. And I guess my question is this. As of 
13 the end of May when you had these new updated 
14 schedules, it's your testimony you didn't have 
15 anything to put together an estimate of the next few 
16 months of business income loss? 
17 A. And I would tell you that based on my 
18 review of the file, I still think that there was 
19 missing financial information that did not allow us 
20 to do an actual loss projection. 
Q. Okay. What was missing? 21 
22 
23 
A. For specific missing information you'd 
have to go back and talk to MD&D. I will tell you 
24 that we typically ask for the last either two or 
25 three years financial information, which wouldR. 3rd Adl~en. 
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1 to the policy? 
2 A. It just indicated to me that they had just 
3 crunched some more numbers. This in itself does not 
4 necessarily tell me that there was sufficient 
5 evidence or sufficient documentation to say this was 
6 an accurate figure. 
7 Q. Okay. Now, on this documentation issue, 
8 what the only place I could find in the claim 
9 notes where you talk about documentation being 
10 lacking occurs at page 131 in the claim notes. 
11 A. Let me get there. Okay. I'm on that 
12 page. 
13 Q. And do you see that where you're saying 
14 you don't have enough information to make a further 
15 advancement. At the top of the page, I believe. 
16 A. There's a note from May 9th. Is that the 
17 one you're referring to? 
18 Q. That's it. I'm sorry. 
19 A. Okay. 
20 MS. DUKE: So what's the question? 
21 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
22 Q. The question is what information did you 
23 think you were missing at that point? 
24 
25 
A. I'd have to look at that entire file to 
tell you specifically. I mean, it' s indicatedR~IJrdAd~en. 
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1 the note that we're looking for the insured's cost 
2 to replace the damaged stock, that had not been 
3 received in the file, and to get back with our 
4 accountants regarding where they stood on their 
5 status with their numbers. 
6 Q. Okay. So I guess at that point you have 
7 to assume for me that this is true, that the first 
8 schedules actually told you how to calculate 
9 business income other than payroll. 
10 But at that point you didn't realize that 
11 MD&D had already provided you with the information 
12 to calculate the business income claim through the 
13 entire year of 2008? 
14 MS. DUKE: Okay. Misstates the evidence. 
15 Misstates the documents. Foundation. You can 
16 go ahead and answer if you can. 
17 A. Okay. Can you repeat the question? I'm 
18 sorry. 
19 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
20 Q. I'll try it a different way. The first 
21 set of schedules, Exhibit 3, those schedules contain 
22 the revenue that was generated by Lakeland in the 
23 year 2007 and 2000 -- or -- yes, 2006, 7. Well, 
24 basically '07 into '08, because we had the collapse 
25 in early '08. R. 3rd Ad. len. 
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1 I'm asking you, did you understand that 
2 you can take those figures on page 3 of that 
3 schedule and you could multiply them times the 
4 projected increase in sales, which is that 11 
5 percent figure, and then multiply that times that 18 
6 percent figure, did you understand that's how you 
7 could calculate the business income for any month in 
8 the year 2000 
9 
10 
11 
MS. DUKE: Same objections. 
A. The projected numbers are just that, 
they're just projections. If there was additional 
12 information that was needed by the accountants to 
13 verify those numbers, that's what they would have 
14 been requesting. 
15 Projected numbers can fluctuate based upon 
16 seasonal influxes, economic influxes. We can't 
17 it's not -- it would not be accurate to use one set 
18 of numbers across the board. 
19 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
20 
21 
Q. 
A. 
And who told you that? 
It wouldn't. I mean, sales in a hardware 
22 store, retail, fluctuate with the economy, fluctuate 
23 with the customer base, fluctuate with seasonal 
24 issues. It just would not -- what you do in January 
25 would not necessarily be what you would do in fP.~dAd~en. 
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1 to you that you were behind, for lack of a better 
2 term, by about $73,951? 
3 MS. DUKE: Same objections. 
4 A. It provided the documentation to show 
5 additional payment warranted that we did not 
6 previously have. 
7 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
8 Q. And who told you that it - that you 
9 had -- I mean, who told you you didn't have the 
10 information to generate this schedule prior to this 
11 time? 
12 MS. DUKE: Object to the form. She didn't 
13 generate the schedule. 
14 BY MR. BISTLINE: 
15 Q. Did -- at some point you received a 
16 schedule and you hadn't had it prior to that point. 
17 Had anybody at your accounting firm told you that we 
18 cannot generate this schedule because we don't have 
19 the information we need? 
20 A. Amy at Matson & Driscoll had continuously 
21 advised that we were missing documentation needed to 
22 have another schedule. 
23 Q. Did she ever indicate to you that the 
24 missing documentation somehow impeded her ability to 
25 properly evaluate the claim? R. 3rd Ad ~en. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICJL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTy OF KOOTENAI 
LAKELAND TRUE VALliE HARDWARE, 
L.L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation, 
Defendant. 
I 
! 
! 
i 
ase No.: CV-08-7069 
LAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONTINUE 
RlAL 
Plaintiff moves this Court for B. continuance on the srounds that Plaintiffs expert witness 
is unavailable for trial on the present date set. This motion is supported by the Affidavits of 
Arthur M. Bistline) Daniel Harper, CPA and the memorandum in support. 
DATED this 19th t day of March, 2010. 
PI.AINTJFf'S MOTtON TO CONTINUE - I 
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'C1P I hereby certifY that on the 11 day of March, 2010, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Keely E. Duke 
Bryan A. Nickels 
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDIeI L DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUN1fY OF KOOTENAI 
LAKELAND TRUE Y ALUE HARDWARE, 
L.L.C., 
I 
aSe:; No.: CV -08-7069 
Plaintiff, 
laintitrs Memorandum in Suppon of Mati on 
o Reconsider Dismissal ofPLaintifi's Bad Faith 
VS. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporado~ 
Defendant. 
laims. ' 
Hartford delayed..12ayment hecause.af information that had nrlt been provided to their 
accountants - not beca~e of " ... unsupported, inconsistent and changing claim 
. d.emamfs .. , ,. and it was error for this CQurt to dismiss Lakeland' s bad faith delay claim 
on tho:le 1Uounds. : 
The following is not in dispute l 1) Hartford paid morc than half of the total value of this 
claim ~ the period ofrcstoration had ended; 2) Hartford did not make any payment 
whatsoever for lost busines,s income during the months of July. August. September or October 
2008; 3) Hartford made one payment in November 2008; 4) Hartford did not make another 
payment until March 2009; 5) Hartford did not pay for the damagedinvemory until June 2009J 
I All from the Affidavit of Mclany Copley In Support of Hnnford'S Motion for Summary Judgment (Copl .. y 
affidavit) at Paragraph 2. 
PlainHtrs MemorafliJum in SUPpOrt of Motioo to R~nsit!er 
DismlsSll\ of Plaintit't's aaa faith Claim$ - I 
--_ .... ---- --- -~---------~----~~--------
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more than a year and 16 months after the collapse. The delay in making these payments causes 
severe financial hardship to Lakeland and prevented the timely opening of the store.2 
Lakeland must prove that Hartford's delay in making the required business income 
payments and inventory loss payments was not objectively reasonable. 3 On summary judgment, 
Hartford offered no evidence justifying its decision to delay payments to Lakeland. Although 
presented facts surrounding the communications between Lakeland's agents and Hartford's 
agents, Hartford never argued that this communication issue was the cause of this delay. There 
is not now and has never been any eXRlanation from Hartford for this delay. It is not in the 
record, Hartford on more than one occasion has been invited to cite to the record to show any 
explanation for this delay and Hartford has never once responded because the point was simply 
not raised on summary judgment 
This Court found the delay claim was addressed - that Hartford did explain why it 
refused to pay -- but this finding has no support in the record. The objection to the consideration 
of that claim is renewed here and not waived. Hartford did not raise the delay claim so 
Lakeland was under no duty to present any evidence to defend it. In any event, Lakeland did, 
" ... prove coverage to the point that, based on the evidence the insurer had before it, the insurer 
intentionally and unreasonably withheld the insured's benefits." Robinson v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company, 137 Idaho 173,178,45 P.2d 829,834 (2002). 
The policy in this case provides, "We will pay for the actual loss of Business Income you 
sustain due to the necessary suspension of your "operations" during the period of restoration." 4 
2 Bates Stamped Affdiavir of Dan Harper filed February J oth, 20 I 0 (Harper Bates Affidavit), at bates 23; Affidavit 
of Mike Fritz in Opposition to Summary Judgment filed paragraphs 10, and J 3 through 22. 
3 As this Court has recognized, negligence is sufficient to support bad faith. "In Selkirk Seed Co. v. State ins. Fund, 
the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that an action against one's own insurer (first party bad faith), independent of 
breach of contract, is limited to intentional or negligent denial or delay of payment." Roylance v. John Alden Life 
Ins. Co. 2008 WL 4202018, 4 (Idaho Dist.2008) 
4 Copley affidvait at Exhibit A H405. 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider 
Dismissal of Plaintiffs Bad Faith Claims 
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(emphasis supplied). The policy does not specify when these payments must be made. "When 
no time of periormance is expressed in a contract, which was so in this case, it will be implied 
that the contract must be performed within a reasonable time. Batt v. Idaho Stale Bldg. Authority, 
122 Idaho 471, 477,835 P.2d 1282, 1288 (1992) citing Obray v. Mitchell, 98 Idaho 533, 567 
P.2d 1284 (1977) and McFarlandv. Joint School Dist. No. 365,108 Idaho 519,700 P.2d 141 
(Ct.App.1985). 
As this Court pointed out, the payments should have been made when Hartford had 
sufficient information before it to make a payment, i.e., when Lakeland had proven its claim to 
the point that it would be unreasonable for Hartford to withhold payment. Robinson, supra. 
Hartford had the information it needed to calculate the payments in early March 2008, calculated 
those payments and then refused to make them. The only explanation as to why the payments 
were not made was because the accountants did not have enough information. Not because of the 
inconsistent claim demands as this Court has found. 
Lakeland provided sufficient information for Hartford's accountants to calculate the 
payment due for each month of lost business income and Hartford's accountants calculated due 
for the lost business income in mid-March 2008. 5 The accounting firm hired by Hartford's 
adjuster received the required financial information from Lakeland in early March 2008 
including profit and loss statements. 6 In mid-March, the accountant developed schedules from 
which to make advances to Lakeland and called to discuss those with Kale, the adjuster. Those 
schedules were for making advances over the next four months. The schedules estimated payroll 
expense $18,622 but the accountant was very clear that the numbers did not include amounts for 
payroll other than tor Mike and Kathy Fritz. Kale called Mike Fritz and was told they were 
paying the entire payroll, not just their own.7 There is no evidence that Kale ever communicated 
5 Copely affidavit at Exhibit C H17. 
6 Affidavit of Dan Harper filed in opposition to Hartford's Summary Judgment Motion at paragraph 5. 
7 Copley affidavit at Exhibit C H 17. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support or Motion 10 Reconsider 
Dismissal of Plaintiffs Bad Faith Claims 
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this fact to the accountants or in any way directed that they recomputed their schedules based on 
this infonnation. As a result, the accountants' schedules underestimated Lakeland's payroll 
expense by approximately 330%. The total payroll expense from the four months of the prior 
year was $61,503 8, which is roughly 330% higher than the Hartford's payroll estimate used to 
pay Lakeland during the months of February through May 2008. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the adjuster had sufficient information from this first set of 
schedules to make an advance through the end of May 2008, no advance was made. This 
resulted in the under funding of the claim for the months of February, April, and the first 23 days 
of May 2008 and caused cash flow stress on Lakeland.9 
In May 2008, Hartford received an updated set of schedules (the second set of schedules) 
from the accountants. The second set of schedules revealed that Lakeland's claim had been 
under funded by over $73,000 and a payment for that amount was mailed May 23 fd , 2008. The 
second set of schedules also reflects a funding requirement for June of $30,000 but this amount 
was not mailed until mid-July. JO On July 16th , 2008, Kale the adjuster told Lakeland that she was 
now able to issue the loss of income for June, II however, she had sufficient infOlmation to make 
that payment since May 20 th, 2008. 12 Thereafter, Hartford/Kale did not make any business 
income payments until November 2008, even though they had all the information they need to 
calculate those payments. This resulted in a deficiency in payments of $111,000 for those 
months. l3 
It is not in dispute that Lakeland proved its claim to the point that it was unreasonable for 
Hartford to delay payments. Hartford's accountants received Lakeland's financial information 
8 Affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline at 7 
9 Harper Bates Affidavit at bates 23. 
10 Harper Bates Affidavit at 23. 
11 Copley Affidavit at Exhibit C H146. 
12 Harper Bates Affdidavit at 23. 
13 rd. 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in S\lpport of Motion to Reconsider 
Dismissal of Plaintiffs Bad Faith Claims 
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and calculated the payments. Hartford withheld the payments and this Court has excused 
Hartford because "This Court has found that when Lakeland started the ball rolling by 
making its claim, Lakeland made unsupported, inconsistent and changing claim demands 
upon Hartford." 14 This a finding of fact which has no support in the record, but more 
importantly, the" ... unsupported, inconsistent and changing claim demands upon Hartford" is 
not why the adjusters withheld payment according to their own testimony. 
Hartford withheld payment and Hartford's justification for doing so is that the 
accountants did not have all the infonnation those accountants required. 
By Mr. Bistline to Ms. Reynolds, the supervising adjuster: 
Q: Let's jus say right after the suit was filed, before you talked to an attorney, 
did you inform anybody at the Hartford, other than your lawyer, that no 
business income payment had been made for July August or September? 
A: Personally, no. 
Q: And why hadn't a payment been made for those months? 
A: Lack of documentation and financial information. 15 
At no point did the adjusters testify that the "inconsistent, unsupported and changing" demand's 
from Lakeland was the reason that payment was withheld. This Court's finding of fact that 
Lakeland's "inconsistent, unsupported and changing" demands justified Hartford's delay in 
making payment is not only not supported in this record, it is contrary to the only evidence in the 
record on that subject. 
On summary judgment, Hartford at no point raised or argued why it had withheld the 
periodic payments due under this policy and it was and is en'or to consider the delay claim on 
H Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Hartford's Motions in Limine at 4. d 
15 Deposition of Reynolds at 29:20 attached to the affidavit of Arthur M. Bistline in support of motion for It. 3r Adden. 
continuance filed 3119/10. 040 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider 
Dismissal of PlaintifTs Bad Faith Claims - 5 
summary judgment. In order to explain this delay, something had to be in the record from 
Hartford's accountants because the accountants are the ones who, according to Hartford, did not 
have enough information to calculate these payments. 16 There is nothing in this record from any 
of Hartford's accountants, therefore, there is nothing in the record to explain the delay. 
However, Lakeland did prove coverage to the point that it was unreasonable for Hartford 
to withhold payments under the policy. Lakeland provided the required financial information, 
the accountants calculated the lost business income (albeit incorrectly at first because of the 
negligence of the adjuster) and then Hartford withheld regular payment of the amount calculated 
for lost business income. Hartford did this because of as-of-yet unidentified missing information 
- not because of inconsistent claim demands. It is for the jury to decide if this "missing 
information" justified Hartford withholding payment and causing Lakeland, its owners and 
employees severe financial distress. 
Lakeland should be allowed to present evidence of damages incurred after January 28[\ 2009, 
because the policy pays lost business income during the period of restoration and that the legnth 
of that period is a question of fact. 
The policy here provides that it will pay lost business income during the period of 
restoration. 17 The period of restoration is not limited to any specific time, but is determined 
based on the existence of a set of facts pertaining to the reasonable to time repair, replacement or 
rebuild the property at the damaged store or when the insured opens a new store elsewhere. 18 A 
different section of the policy provides that Hartford will only pay lost business income for 12 
months. 19 These are two different limitations 011 the time frame during which lost business 
16 See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for a Continuance at pages 3 and 4 wherein the adjuster state 
that the accountants are the ones who were claiming to be missing information. 
17 Copley affidvait at Exhibit A H405 paragraph 0, (1) 
18 Copley affidavit at Exhibit A H419 paragraph G, 12. 
19 Copley affidvait at H405 paragraph 0, (3). 
Plain tifT's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider 
Dismissal of Plaintiffs Bad Faith Claims 
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income will be paid and this renders the insurance contract subject to conflicting interpretations 
which must be resolved in favor of Lakeland. 
In Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Talbot, 133 Idaho 428, 987 P.2d 1043, 1044(1999) the 
Idaho Supreme Court considered a policy containing inconsistent limitations on the coverage 
provided. Farmers argued that one part of the policy can grant coverage and another part can 
clearly limit that coverage. The Court responded, 
The Dear Policyholder" language attempts to limit Talbot's UIM 
coverage in one manner, while the limitation of liability clause 
attempts to limit Talbot's UIM coverage in a different manner. 
Because the provisions attempt to limit Talbot's UIM coverage 
in two different ways, ambiguity exists. Because ambiguity 
exists, the traditional rule of construction applies- i.e., the 
insurance contract must be construed strongly against the 
Insurer. 
133 Idaho 428, 435, 987 P.2d 1043, 
1050 ( 1999) (emphasis supplied) 
In this case, coverage for lost business income is granted in one place and then limited in two 
different ways - one by a time of 12 months and a second that is related to when the business 
could reasonably resume operations. 
Given the two different limitations on business income coverage, the policy is an1biguous 
as to the limitation and, as matter oflaw, that ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the insured. 
Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Talbot, 133 Idaho 428, 435, 987 P.2d 1043, 1044 (1999) Therefor, 
the Hartford should be required to provide coverage during the "period of restoration" whatever 
the jury determines that date to be based on the definition of that term in the policy. Hartford 
utilized the limitation in the "period of restoration" and cannot complain about being held to it. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider 
Dismissal of Plaintiffs Bad Faith Claims 
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'rhis Court should and allow Dan Harper to testify 10 all matters within hi.s area of 
expertise and for whi.ch he is competent and not limit his testimony to damages incurred before 
the expiration of 12 months. 
DATED this 6th , day of April, 2010. 
ARTHUR M. BlSTLlNE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
[ hereby cerliJ)i lhat on the ......... day of February, 2010, T served a true and CCHTect copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Keely E Duke 
Bryan A. Nickels 
Flail, Farley, ObC1Tccht & Blanton, P.!\. 
P.O. Box ]271 
Boise, ID 83701 
US Mail 
__ ... _ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (208) 395-8585 
Enutil 
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Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE, Case No: CV08-7069 
L.L.C., 
LAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO 
Plaintiff, EFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY 
vs. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut Corporation, 
Defendant. 
STRUCTIONS 
I. Objection to Statement of Undisputed Facts (Exhibit "A") 
A. The recitation of the paragraph regarding the resumption of operations is not 
proper. While Plaintiff Lakeland (hereinafter "Lakeland") does have a duty to resume operations 
as quickly as possible, Defendant Hartford's (hereinafter "Hartford") remedy for them failing to 
do so is to reduce the amount ofloss, which Hartford has not done. The policy provides "We 
will reduce the amount of your: a. Business Income loss, other than Extra Expenses, to the extent 
you can resume your' operations', in whole or in part .... " (Item 5) Hartford did not reduce the 
loss based on this provision so it is improper for them to suggest it was breached here. More so 
since they do not intend to seek a reduction of the claim based on it. It has never been relevant to 
the adjustment of the claim and Hartford has at no point alleged it was breached. R. 3
rd Adden. 
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PLAINTIFF'S OBJECT[ONS TO nF,rFNnANT\~ PRnpnQr;'TI lTmv l~l~TDl !f"'TrrY",C 
B. Item lOis not necessary. There are many undisputed facts in this case and it is 
not necessary to point out this specific one so the jury has it in front of them during their 
deliberations. Hartford is trying to put it in the jury's head that it was Lakeland's obligation to 
pay Klein's. The policy clearly requires Hartford to pay this expense, just as Hartford did. The 
Klein's invoice clearly states that Lakeland's obligation to pay is contingent on its insurance 
company's default in payment. (Defendant's Exhibit "1013" attached as Exhibit HB") 
C. Items 17 and 18 are objected to on the same grounds set forth for Item 10 above. 
It is not necessary for these facts to be pointed out. 
D. Item 19 needs to have the phrase "based on additional information provided to 
Harford ... " This is the ultimate finding - whether or not Hartford was justified in withholding 
payment pending receipt of information. It is suggestive that Hartford was justified in 
withholding payment pending receipt of this "additional information" which has yet to be 
identified. 
E. Item 35 is objected to on the grounds that at the Motion in Limine where this was 
decided, the Motion sought to limit the damages to approximately $54,000. Then at hearing, this 
$19,000 figure came up based on Dan Harpers new report. The Hartford's point was that based 
on his report and the payments, only $19,000 remained. The problem is that Hartford counted an 
entire check for rent as a business income payment (see Item 22 on this instruction) but under the 
policy, only approximately Y:. of that was a business income payment for rent. The other Y:: was 
the cost to obtain access to a place to evaluate the inventory - namely the store. Hartford is not 
including an10unts paid to Klein's to handle the inventory issue as business personal property, so 
it cmIDot include amounts paid to Lakeland's landlord for the same purpose. 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO DFFFNnA NT'';;: PRnpn';;:PTI TTlDV [1\11;:'1'0 r 10'1'10"11<.'C' 
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F. Item 31 is not necessary. Hartford determined the period of restoration, whether 
they did so pursuant to the policy or not is for the jury. Hartford has already testified that the 
period is when "the building is rebuilt" which ignores the plain language of the policy that 
provides that it is when the property at the premises reasonably should have been repaired or 
replaced, etc. The inventory was property at the described premises that could not have been 
replaced by the end of October 2008. 
II. Objection to Defendants Proposed Exhibit "e" - Lakeland~s Burden 
This instruction incorrectly states that it is Lakeland's burden to prove the period of 
restoration. The period of restoration is a limitation on the 12 months of coverage and is 
Hartford's burden to prove. 
The period of restoration is a "condition subsequent" because it operates on the contract 
subsequent to the fact of loss. "The condition of the policy in respect to giving notice of 
permanent disability as well as making proof of death operates upon the contract subsequent to 
the factofloss." Bennett v. New York Life Ins. Co. 121 P.2d 551, 554 (1942). The "fact" of 
the period of restoration operates to terminate coverage subsequent to the loss. The insurance 
company has the burden of proving this condition subsequent. 
In Peterson v. Universal Automobile Ins. Co. 20 P.2d 1016,1022 (1933), the insured 
argued, that, " ... where the insurer relies upon the breach of a condition subsequent, incorporated 
in a policy of insurance, to defeat the right of insured to recover after loss, the insurer must 
specially plead and prove such condition and the breach thereof; that such breach is a matter of 
defense and the burden of proving it is upon the defendant." The Supreme Court agreed, but 
stated that it was not raised below. 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS Tn DFFFNnA NT'~ PR(w()C'>:;n TT Jl)V r,,)C'TD r TrTTflX[C' 
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Logically, how could Lakeland show Hartford failed to comply with the "period of 
restoration provision?" The period of restoration is not a "duty" for Hartford to comply with, it 
is a fact for the jury to find. lfthe jury does not determine that fact to be the end of October, 
then the Hartford owes for the whole 12 months as there is nothing else from Hartford to suggest 
that the store could have been opened on any other date prior to the 12 month period. 
III. Exhibit "D" - Hartford's Burdens 
Any reference to the resumption of operations should be deleted as set forth above. 
Furthennore, this "condition subsequent" was not specifically plead as required by Peterson 
above. 
Any reference to the "proof of loss" must be deleted as this "condition subsequent" was 
not specifically plead as required by Peterson above, and has never been raised in this case. 
In addition, the instruction must include an instruction that Hartford must prove it was 
prejudiced in its evaluation of the claim by the breach of any of the conditions. "Both the fact of 
the violation of the conditions of the policy, and that prejudice resulted there from, are matters ... 
which must be pleaded and proved by the insurer." ld. at 161,213 P.2d at 923. Further, the 
insurer is required to establish prejudice without benefit of a presumption. Union Warehouse 
and Supply Co., Inc. v. Illinois R.B. Jones, Inc. 128 Idaho 660, 666,917 P.2d 1300, 1306 (1996) 
IV. Response to Hartford's Objections to Plaintiffs Instructions 
A. Objection to Instruction 2. 
This objection is based on the lack of an oral agreement. The instruction pertains to more 
than oral agreements and states that the jury may not consider explanations or interpretations of 
written words which are plainly at odds with what those words say. Just as here, where Hartford 
R. 3rd Adden. 
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reads the period of restoration as ending "when the building is rebuilt" which is not even close to 
what the policy says. 
R Objection to Proposed Instruction 4. 
The first objection is that timing of payments is not relevant. Hartford clearly is arguing 
now that timing is. 
The second objection is based on the fact that a reasonableness standard is not 
appropriate. As pointed out, Mr. Fritz's expectations do not establish what is reasonable. What 
is reasonable is judged by an objective standard and is the standard by which performance under 
a contract is governed. "Every contract contains a duty of reasonable performance." 
Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn Lea Family Trust 145 Idaho 208, 217, 177 P Jd 
955, 964 (2008) Also, "It is well settled that where no time for performance is established in the 
agreement, the law implies that performance must occur within a reasonable time." Ujdur v. 
Thompson, 126 Idaho 6,9,878 P.2d 180, 183 (Ct.App.l994) The policy does not state when 
payments are to be made so those payments are to be made when it is reasonable to do so, which 
is when the insurance company had enough information to make those payments and not risk 
"under or over paying the claim" as Ms. Reynolds testified to. 
DATED this 26 th day of May, 2010. 
ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JI TRY TNSTRTl{'TT(1NQ - <: 
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I hereby certify that on theJ..k£>day of May, 2010, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO DEFENANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Keely E. Duke 
Bryan A. Nickels 
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Boise, ID 83701 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
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Email 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ _ 
The following facts are not in dispute: 
1. Lakeland was insured by Hartford under Business Spectrum policy no. 83 
SBF SX5295 ("Policy"), 
2. The Business Personal Property policy limit is $370,000. 
3. Business Income Coverage is limited to 12 months from the date of the 
occurrence, or the termination of the "Period of Restoration": 
o. Business Income 
(1) We will pay for the actual loss of Business Income you sustain due to the 
necessary suspension of your "operations" during the "period of restoration", 
The suspension must be caused by direct physical loss of or physical damage to 
property at the "scheduled premises ", caused by or resulting from a Covered 
Cause of Loss. 
(2) With respect to the requirements set forth in the preceding paragraph, if you 
occupy only part of the site at which the "scheduled premises" are located, your 
"scheduled premises" also means: 
(a) The portion of the building which you rent, lease or occupy; and 
(b) Any area within the building or on the site at which the "scheduled 
premises" are located, but only if that area services, or is used to gain 
access to, the "scheduled premises. " 
(3) We will only pay for loss of Business Income that occurs within 12 consecutive 
months after the date of direct physical loss or physical damage. This Additional 
Coverage is not subject to the Limits of Insurance, 
(4) Business Income means the: 
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(aJ Net Income (Net Profit or Loss before income ta:xe/)~ that would have 
been earned or incurred if no direct physical/ass or physical damage had 
occurred,' and 
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(b) Continuing normal operating expenses incurred, including payroll, 
(5) With respect to the coverage provided in this Additional Coverage, 
suspension means: 
(a) The partial slowdown or complete cessation of your business 
activities; or 
(b) Thatpart or all of the lfscheduled premises" is rendered untentantable 
[sic} as a result of a Covered Cause of Loss if coverage for Business 
Income applies to the policy. 
An additional period of 120 days of Extended Business Income is provided once operations are 
resumed. 
4. The «Period of Restoration" is defined, in relevant part, as follows: 
12. "Period of Restoration" means the period of time that: 
a. Begins with the date of direct physical loss or physical damage 
caused by or resulting from a Covered Cause of Loss at the 
"scheduled premises, " and 
b. Ends on the date when: 
(1) The property at the "scheduled premises >1 should be 
repaired, rebuilt, or replaced with reasonable speed and 
similar quality; 
(2) The date when your business resumed at a new, permanent 
location. 
5. Section E.7 (Property Loss Conditions d Resumption of Operations) of 
the Policy provides, in relevant part: 
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7. Resumption of Operations 
In the event of physical loss or physical damage at the "scheduled 
premises II you must resume all or part of your ({operations" as quickly 
as possible. 
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We will reduce the amount of your: 
a, Business Income loss, other than Extra Expenses, to the extent you 
can resume your 'operations', in whole or in part, by using 
damaged and undamaged properly (including merchandise or 
stock) at the 'scheduled premises' or elsewhere." 
6. Section E.3 (Property Loss Conditions - Duties in the Event of Loss or 
Damage) of the Policy provides, in relevant part: 
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3. Duties in The Event Of Loss Or Damage 
You must see that the following are done in the event of loss of or damage 
to Covered Property: 
b. 
d. 
e. 
f 
h. 
Give us prompt notice of the physical loss or physical damage, 
Include a description of the property involved. 
Take all reasonable steps to protect the Covered Property from 
further damage by a Covered Cause of Loss. If feasible, set the 
damaged properly aside in the best possible order for examination. 
Also, keep a record of your business expenses for emergency and 
temporary repairs,for consideration in the settlement of the claim. 
At our request, give us complete inventories of the damaged and 
undamaged properly, Include quantities, costs, values and amount 
0/ loss claimed 
Permit us to inspect the property and records proving the loss or 
damage. Also permit us to take samples of damaged property jor 
inspection, testing and analysis, 
Send us a Signed, sworn statement of loss containing the 
in/ormation we request to investigate the claim. You must do this 
within 60 days after our request, We will supply you with the 
necessary forms, 
R. 3rd Adden. 
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i. Cooperate with us in the investigation or settlement of the claim. 
j. Resume part or all afyour "operations" as quickly as possible. 
7. On January 28, 2008, following heavy snowfall, a portion of Lakeland's 
store roof collapsed. 
8. Following a reporting of the claim by Lakeland, Hartford's pnmary 
examiner, Julia Kale, assigned investigation of the loss to GAB Robins on January 29, 2008 
9. Hartford approved an advance on Business Personal Property in the 
amount of $50,000 on Febmary 1,2008, which was paid on or about F~bruary 4, 2008. 
10. On February 4, 2008, Mike Fritz of Lakeland signed a Work 
Authorization and a Disposal Authorization with Klein's to conduct a general dean-up of the 
store premises, dispose of spoiled perishable inventory, and store remaining preservable 
inventory. 
11. Inventory from the store was placed into four trailers maintained by 
Klein's. 
12. Hartford assigned analysis of the Business Income claim to Amy Kohler 
of Madsen, Driscoll & Damico ("MD&D") in Seattle on February 20,2008. 
13. An initial Business Income advance in the amount of $50,000 was made 
on March 18, 2008. 
14. Based upon the infonnation provided to Hartford, a Business Income loss 
0[$123,951 through May 31,2008 wag identified, and a check for the balance of $73,951.00 (in 
light of the prior $50,000 advance) was issued on May 23,2008. 
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15. Based upon additional information provided to Hartford in July, an 
additional Business Income $30,144,00 payment was made on July 17,2008 for June figures. 
16. The Certificate of Occupancy for the store space was issued on October 
3,2008. 
17. On November 22, 2008, Hartford was provided Lakeland's 874 page 
complete inventory list. 
18. Generating the full 874 page inventory report took Mr. Fritz only 
"roughly two hours, maybe three hours." 
19. Based upon additional information provided to Hartford, an additional 
Business Income $31,699 payment was made on November 12,2008 for July figures. 
20. Hartford paid $22,529.44 to Klein's on November 12, 2008, for storage 
costs associated with the storage of the surviving inventory and fixtures. 
21. Hartford provided another advance for Business Personal Property on 
February 29, 2009, in the amount of $70,000. 
22. Hartford provided another advance for Business Income on March 17, 
2009, in the amount of $28,590. 
23. Hartford paid an additional $15,579.28 to Klein's on March 17,2009, for 
storage costs associated with the storage of the surviving inventory and fixtures. 
24. The inventory process was begun on March 30,2009, with Mr. and Mrs. 
Fritz, a representative of from Lakeland's counsel's office, Hartford's counsel, and Hartford's 
appointed salvor, Dan McMurray of Greer & Kirby. 
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25. The actual physical inventorying process continued through April 8, 
2009, although the compilation of data - including the provision of replacement values by Mr. 
Fritz -continued through June 8, 2009. 
26. Hartford issued four additional payments for Business Personal Property 
in conjunction vvith the results of the physical inventorying process: $633.85 on May 15, 2009, 
$50,000 on June 10,2009; $127,886.44 on June 18,2009; and $5,946.29 to Klein's on August 
10,2009. 
27. Hartford issued a Business Personal Property payment of $10,000 to 
Lakeland on August 10, 2009 for claims expenses. 
28. Based upon additional information provided to Hartford in 2009, 
Hartford made additional Business Income payments of $51,573 on May 22, 2009 and $450 on 
August 10,2009. 
29. Following Lakeland's identification of its failure to identify certain 
missing inventory from its Business Personal Property ctaim, Hartford issued a final Business 
Personal Property payment of$43,074.95 on March 1,2010. 
30. Hartford has paid the policy limits of $370,000 in payments for the 
Business Personal Property claim. 
31. Pursuant to the telms of the Policy, Hartford determined that the end-date 
of the Period of Restoration for the Business Income component of the claim is October 31, 
2008. 
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32. MD&D has calculated a total Business Income loss, through October 31, 
2008, of$266,407.00, which has been paid in full by Hartford. 
33. Lakeland re-opened on August 20,2009, using shelf-ready inventory 
stored in the trailers, and damaged inventory recovered from the trailers. 
34. Hartford has paid a total of $653,057.25 in Business Personal Property 
and Business Income claims under the Policy; the policy limits of $370,000 as Business Personal 
Property, an additional $9,254.25 for Outdoor Signage and $7,396.00 for Computers and Media, 
and $266,407.00 as Business Income. 
35. Lakeland's claim for Business Income for the disputed time period of 
November 1,2008 through January27, 2009 is no more than $19,052.00. 
IDJI2d 1.07. 
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...... DJSASTERKLEEH·UP ~j 
Work Authorf%atlon 
1.4<t.la ... " 
• Customer: - IOj.. VcJt.J.L Hc,rrl, UC2.. Phone: 
• [au;urance ComPlliny: ...:S:...;;:e-"J~'f"·~=-.(,.l (;;:jk~· ___________ _ 
t . Deductiblt':: __ ~ ________ _ 
PrDperty Address; 
., Street: II o4~Y bl· ~~ 4\ 
., CJty/State!~fiQ(ID 
Mailing Ad<iresti; 
• S~: eo~ bt:JX /60 
• Oty/State: &Jt.,J..Nu"'J . 1,4 , 
Zip: eSft:Se 
.• Work to Perform: .... (I ... td ... · .... n\en\5~......,-.,.. ________________ _ 
I hereby auttJol'i2:e Klelo's Disaster Kleenop to reptllr the darn2lgil W my property 
co'.'etal under my trnrura~ p(>fl(;)'. 
r autllOruf: my In$urance compllny to make cllrett payment to Klein's Oisaste. 
Kleenup on my ~&'f when repairs .h<l~. ~en compl8ted to my satf!:f.Jct.lon. 
1 Imderstand that I am rHponsibll! to pay my dedur;tjb!e to Klein's Dhimer 
.Kleenup. J am IJftlm~tely responSible to Klein's Olsaster 1{Ieenup for thf: entire 
biIHng shollld the Insuraflce comJ)aoy detault on any 
Datlt ____ _ 
D"te~ -I.f""()( 
1 
I 
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DisooMJ AutJwjgtio,u 
D1SASTJm K.LEENUP, TO DISPOSE OF Q:TJ!.MS WILL GO TO THE 
COUNTY DUMP): biro;. ~imkik 
REM0yED'FROM; Ie e~<Qt.j t:J,. t=f&~~ ~\ ~4~.~ 
~."'~ . ·o~ IYI~ OUETO eoIIVtJf.· . 
11llS AUfnOruzATION R.E.l.EMES 1CLIIDr8 DI8AS1'ER KLEENUP FROM 
ANY FUTURE CLAIMS REGARDING HIlRIN MJ?NT[ONED GOODS. 
KLEl:N'S D1SAS"fER JQ..EENUl> IS NOT R¥SPONStaLE roR ANY ITEMS 
IliA T ARE LEFT ON THE 1'REMISES. 1NSIDE OR O'UTSlD:E OF THE 
ao'tJSE.\ 
2 
R. 3rd A<,lden . 
. 058 
INSTRUCTION NO, __ _ 
Lakeland has alleged that Hartford breached the insurance contract by providing and 
paying a Business Income claim for a "Period of Restoration" from January 28, 2008 through 
October 31, 2008. 
To prove a breach of contract, Lakeland must demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Hartford failed to comply with the "Period of Restoration" provision of the policy, 
which states: 
The "Period of Restoration" is defined, in relevant part, as follows: 
12. "Period of Restoration" means the period of time that: 
a. Begins with the date of direct physical loss or physical damage 
b. Ends on the date when: 
(1) The property at the "scheduled premises" should be 
(2) The date when your business resumed at a new, permanent 
Lakeland has the burden of proving each of the following propositions: 
] . A contract existed between Lakeland and Hartford; 
2. Hartford breached the contract by not complying with the "Period of Restoration" 
provision of the insurance contract. 
3. Lakeland has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
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If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions 
required of Lakeland has been proved, then you must consider the issue of the affirmative 
defenses raised by the defendant, and explained in the next instruction. If you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been 
proved, your verdict should be for Hartford. 
IDJI2d 6.1 0.1. (Modified) 
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INSTRUCTION NO. __ _ 
Hartford has asserted that Lakeland breached its own duties under the insurance contract. 
Hartford has the burden of proYing that Lakeland breached one or more of the follovnng 
duties under the insurance contract: 
3. Duties in The Event OJ Loss Or Damage 
You must see that the follOWing are done in the event of loss of or damage fo 
b. Give us prompt notice of the physical/oss or physical damage. 
d. Take all reasonable steps to protect the Covered Property from 
a record of your business expenses for emergency and temporary repairs, 
e. At our request, give us complete inventories of the damaged and 
f Permit us to inspect the property and records proving the loss or 
h. Send us a signed, sworn statement of loss containing the 
information we request to investigate the claim. You must do this within 
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i. Cooperate with us in the investigation or settlement of the claim. 
j. Resume part or all o/your "operations J/ as qUickly as possible. 
Resumption of Operations 
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· In the event oj physical loss or physicall damage at the "scheduled premises" you 
must resume all or part of your "operations" as quickly as possible. 
We will reduce the amount a/your: 
a. Business Income loss, other than Extra Expenses, to the extent you 
premises' or elsewhere ... 
If this affirmative defense is proved Hartford is excused from performance. 
COMMENTS: 
Couch § 199: 13 
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ARTHUR M. BISTLINE 
BISTLINE LA W, PLLC 
1423 N Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 665-7270 
R E ci"E!"-"';:::O"--"-"-1 ~'n 'I; C. J 
MAY~> £; 'in-'fl il 
i •• ~ \) .f ... ufi} 
(208) 665-7290 (fax) 
abistline@pOYD.COm 
ISB: 5216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LAKELAND TRUE Y ALUE HARDWARE, 
t.L.c., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a ConnecticLlt Corporation, 
Icase No: CV08-7069 
[PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTfONS TO AND 
rROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
I 
I Defendant. 
___ -1 
Objections: 
Question No.4 is improper. There is no evidence by which the jury can determine the 
amount of damages Lakeland could have mitigated. That would require a calculation of when 
the store could opened, and how much they could have earned jfthey had done that. There is no 
evidence on this subject. The concepts of percentage of fault is comparative fault and a concept 
in tort, not contract. 
Proposed Special Jury Verdict Form: 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
Question No.1: Could Lakeland have reasonably repaired or replaced the personal 
property damaged in the roof collapse with personal property of similar quality by October 3 rt, 
! 
I 
,J 
2008? R. 3rd Adden. 
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PLAfNTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO AND PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT fORM - J 
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Yes 
or 
No 
Question No.2: If your answer to Question No.1 is "No", was Lakeland unable to repair, or 
replace the personal property damaged in the roof collapse with personal property of similar 
quality by October 31 5\ 2008 because Hartford had not funded the business personal property 
portion of the claim to a sufficient point to allow the store to open by October 31 S\ 2008? 
Yes 
or 
No 
If you answer is no, proceed to Question No.5. 
Question No.3: If your answer to Question No.2 was "Yes", did Lakeland breach its duty to 
cooperate with Hartford in the evaluation process of the property claim? 
Yes 
or 
No 
Question No.4: If your answer to Question 3 was yes, then did that breach prejudice Hartford's 
ability to evaluate and pay the claim to a sufficient point to allow Lakeland to reasonably repair, 
or replace the personal property damaged in the roof collapse with personal property of similar 
quality by October 31 st, 2008the store to be open by October 31 st, 2008? 
Yes 
or 
No 
R. 3rd Adden. 
064 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO AND PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 2 
· . 
If your answer to Question Nos. 3 and 4, are It Yes ", then your verdict should be for Hartford. If 
your answer to Question 4 is "no ", then your verdict should be for Lakeland 
Question No.5: Only answer this if your answer to Question No.2 is "No." 
Was the store unable to open because Hartford had not timely paid the business 
income portion of the claim? 
Yes 
or 
No 
If your answer to Question No.5 is "No ", your verdict should be for Hartford If "Yes ", 
proceed below. 
Question No.6: Did Lakeland breach its duty to cooperate with Hartford in the evaluation 
process of the income claim? 
Yes 
or 
No 
Question No.7: If your answer to Question No.6 is "Yes", did this breach prejudice Hartford 
in its ability to evaluate and pay the business income claim in a timely manner? 
Yes 
or 
No 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO AND PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 3 
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If your answer to Questions Nos. 6 and 7 are "Yes", then your verdict should be/or Hartford. If 
either answer is "No ", proceed below. 
Question No.8: We the jury find that the value of the Business Income claim amount between 
November 1,2008 and January 27, 2009 to be 
When you have answered the above questions, sign the verdict form as explained in 
another instruction and inform the bailiff that you have concluded your deliberations. The Court 
\\till know what to do with your answers. 
Please sign the special verdict form and advise the bailiff you have concluded your 
deli berations. 
DATED this 26th , day of May, 2010. 
Foreperson 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO AND PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 4 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE 
LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE 
COMPANY, 
HARDWARE,) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
INSURANCE) 
) 
) 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV 2008 7069 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN 
The Jury Instructions given in the trial of the above action are attached. Copies have 
been given to counsel for all parties. 
DATED this 2-~ day of May, 2010. 
JURY INSTRUCTlONS GIVEN 
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INSTRUCTION NO.1 
Ladies and Gentlemen: 
Now that you have been sworn, I will briefly telJ you something about your duties 
as jurors and give you some instructions. At the end of the trial I will give you additional 
instructions, and those instructions, as well as these preliminary instructions and any 
instructions given during the trial, will control your deliberations. 
These instructions explain your duties as jurors an.d define the law that ~pplies to 
this case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these 
instructions to those facts, and in this way, to decide the case. Your decision should be 
based upon a rational and objective assessment of the evidence. 
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and 
it is your duty to follow the law as j instruct. You must follow these instructions regardless 
of your own opinion of what the law is or should be, or what counsel for any party may 
state the law to be. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not picking out one 
and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the manner in 
which they are numbered has no significance as to their importance. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. 
This evidence wi!! consist of the testimony of witnesses, exhibits admitted into evidence, 
and any stipulated or admitted facts. 
The following things are not evidence and you must not consider them as evidence 
in deciding the facts of this case: 
1. Statements and arguments of the lawyers; 
2. Questions and objections of the lawyers; R. 3rd Adden. 
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3. Testimony that I instruct you to disregard; and 
4. Anything you may have seen or heard when the court is not in session even if 
what you see or hear fs done or said by one of the parties or by one of the witnesses. 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no distinction 
between direct and circumstantial evidence. The law permits you to give equal weight to 
both, but it is for you to decide how much weight to give to any evidence. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rules of law. At times during 
the trial, I may sustain an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer 
it, or to an offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, 
and are sofely my responsibility. You may not speculate as to the reason for any 
objection which was made, or my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may 
not consider such a question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or exhibit 
would have shown. 
Sometimes I may order that evidence be stricken from the record and that you 
disregard or ignore the evidence. That means that when you are deciding the case, you 
must not consider the evidence, which! tofd you to disregard. Some evidence is admitted 
for a limited purpose only. If I instruct you that an item of evidence has been admitted for 
a limited purpose, you must consider it only for that limited purpose and for no other. 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence in the course of the 
trial. As the sale judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and 
what weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the 
experience and background of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating 
testimony. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, 
what you believe and how much weight you attach to what you are told. These R. 3rd Addeo. 
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considerations you use in making the more important decisions in your everyday dealings 
are the same considerations you should apply in your deliberations in this case. 
I n a civil case any party who asserts that certain facts exist or existed has the 
burden of proving those facts. 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the 
expression "if you find," or "if you decide," I mean that you must be persuaded that the 
proposition on which the party has the burden of proof is more probably true than not 
true. 
The law requires that your decision be made solely upon the evidence before you. 
Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in your deliberations. Faithful 
performance by you of these duties is vital to the administration of justice. 
I wilf now say a few words about your conduct as jurors. There are certain things 
you must not do during this triar: 
1. You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury room 
to deliberate at the close of the entire case. 
2. You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the testimony and 
have received my final instructions as to the law that applies to the case. 
3. You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the 
case with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or attempts to influence 
your decision in the case, you must report it to me immediately. 
4. You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or their 
employees, or any witnesses. 
5. You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater 
understanding of the case. R. 3rd Adden. 
070 
3 396 
, ' 
6. You must not go to the place were any alleged event occurred. 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions 
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into 
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the tria! proceedings. 
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby 
diverted from the testimony of the witness. You must keep your notes to yourself and not 
show them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial. 
When you !eave at night, leave your notes in the jury room. 
4 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2, 
To help you follow the evidence, I will give you a brief summary of the positions 
ofllie parties: 
Plaintiff, Lakeland True Value Hardware in Rathdrum, Idaho, has brought this 
breach of contract action against Hartford Fire Insurance Company. 
In January of 2008, the roof of the Lakeland store collapsed from a heavy 
snoVvfalL Lakeland was insured by Hartford under a policy of insurance, which, for 
purposes of this case, provided two kinds of coverage that would apply to this situation: 
tIrst, coverage to replace damaged and destroyed inventory, known as "Business Personal 
Property;" second, coverage for lost income and ongoing expenses for up to 12 months or 
until the store should reopen, whichever came first, known as "Business Income." 
The Lakeland store has reopened and 1S currently operating. 
However, Lakeland claims that Hartford breached the insurance policy by failing 
to provide an additional J months of Business Income payments. Lakeland claims that it 
was not in a position to rcopen in any capacity after the 9 months identified by Hartford 
based upon a cash-flow argument. 
Hartford denies this claim. 
Instead, Hartford asserts that Lakeland should have been able to feSWllC some of 
its operations following the 9-month Business Income period. 
It is your responsibility to decide whether Lakeland has proven its breach of 
contract claim against Hartford by a preponderance of the evidence. If you decide that 
Hartford has breached its insurance contract with Lakeland, you must also decide 
whether Of not Lakeland suffered any damages which it was unable to prevent. 
-
..... 1 . \...-
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INSTRUCTION NO.3 
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I 
have advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be 
decided. 
R. 3rd Adden~ 
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INSTRUCTION NO.4 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give his or her 
opinion on that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should 
consider the qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for the 
witness' opinion. You are not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which 
you deem it entitled. 
R. 3rd Adden~ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by deposition. A deposition is 
testimony taken under oath before the trial and preserved in writing or upon videotape. 
This evidence is entitled to the same consideration you would give had the witness 
testified from thewitness stand. 
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of the 
testimony you are about to hear, this record will not be available to you during your 
deliberations. 
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INSTRUCTION NO.9 
Ladies and Gentlemen: The presentation of evidence is now complete. rt now 
becomes my duty to give you your final instructions as to the law applicable to this case. 
You will remember that at the start of this trial I instructed you as to your duties as finders 
of fact. You must keep those earlier instructions in mind, and faithfully follow them as well 
as the final instructions which! now give you. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. \ D 
The following facts are not in dispute: 
1. Lakeland's claim for Business Income for the disputed time period of 
November 1,2008 through January 27,2009 is no more than $19,052.00. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. \ \ ~ 
Hartford has asserted that Lakeland breached its own duties under the insurance 
contract. 
Hartford has the burden of proving that Lakeland breached one or more of the 
fol1ov.ing duties under the insurance contract: 
3. Duties in The Event Of Loss Or Damage 
You must see that the follo'wing are done in the event of loss of or damage 
to Covered Property: 
h. Give us prompt notice of the physical loss or physical 
damage, IncludrrG description of the property involved 
d. Take all reasonable steps to protect the Covered Property 
,from further damage by a Covered Cause of Loss. If 
feasible, set the damaged property aside in the best 
possible order for examination. A Iso, keep a record of 
your business expenses for emergency and temporary 
repairs, for consideration in the settlement of the claim. 
e, At our request, give us complete inventories afthe damaged 
and undamaged property. Include quantities, costs, values 
and amount of loss claimed. 
f Permit us to inspect the properly and records proving the 
loss or damage. Also permit us to take samples of damaged 
property for inspection, testing and analysis. 
h. Send us a signed, sworn statement of loss containing the 
information we request to investigate the claim. You must 
do this within 60 days after our request. We will supply 
you with the necessary forms, 
i. Cooperate with us in the investigation or settlement of the 
claim, 
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j. Resume part or all of your "operations" as quickly as 
possible. 
7. Resumption of Operations 
In the event of physical luss or physical damage at the "scheduled 
premises" you must resume all or part of your "operations" as quickly as 
possible. 
We will reduce the amount of your: 
a B.usiness Income loss, other than Extra Expenses, fO the extent you can 
resume your 'operations', in whole ore in part, by using damaged 
and undamaged property (including merchandise or stock) at the 
'scheduled premises' or elsewhere .... 
If this affirmative defense is proved Hartford is excused fi'om performance. 
If, however, you find that Lakeland substantially performed all of the above 
Policy duties, then you must find that Hartford has not proven this affirmative defense. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 11 ~ 
. 
In this case Hartford has asserted certain affirmative defenses. Hartford has the burden of 
proof on each of the affirmative defenses asserted. 
Hartford asserts the following aiTirmative defenses: 
1. It substantially pcrfom1ed the contract; 
2. Its performance of the contract was prevented or hindered by Lakeland; and 
3. Lakeland breached its own duties under the Policy. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of the propositions 
required of Hartford has he en proved, then your verdict should be for the defense. If you find 
from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions has not been proved, then 
Hartford has not proved the affirmative defense in this case. 
JUDGE 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
\'v'hen I say that a party must have "substantially performed" the contract or that 
«substantial performance" of the contract is required, I mean that the important and essential 
benefits called for by the tenns of the contract have been delivered or performed. A contract may 
be substantially perfonned even though there may have been some deviations or omissions from 
the perfonnance called for by the precise language of the contract 
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INSTRUCTION NO. \ \ d, 
Hartford has asserted the defense of prevention of performance. Hartford has the burden 
of proving that Lakeland uurcasonably prevented or substantially hindered Hartford's 
perfonnance of the contract. If this affirmative defense is proved, Hartford is excused from 
performance. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. -~tl.<=-.-
Lakeland has alleged that Hartford breached the insurance contract by providing and 
paying a Business Income claim for a "Period of Restoration" from January 28, 2008 through 
October 3 I, 2008. 
To prove a breach of contract, Lakeland must demonSlrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Hartford failed to comply with the "Period of Restoration" provision of the policy, 
which states; 
The "Period of Restoration" is defined, in relevant part, as follows: 
12. "Period of Restoration II means the period uf time thaI: 
a. Begins with the date of direcT physical loss or physical damage 
caused by or resultingfrom a Covered Cause a/Loss aUhe "scheduled 
premises, " and 
b. Ends on the date when: 
(1) The property at the "scheduled premises" should be 
repaired, rebuilt, or replaced with reasonable speed and similar 
quality; 
(2) The date when your business resumed at a new, permanent 
location. 
Lakeland has the burden of proving each of the following propositions: 
1. A contract existed between Lakeland and Hartford; 
2. Hartford breached the contract by not complying with the "Period of Restoration" 
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provision of the insurance contract. 
3. Lakeland has been damaged on account of the breach; and 
4. The amount of the damages. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that e1!fh-·.of .the propositions 
.7 ; 
required of Lakeland has been proved, then you must consider the issue of the affinnative 
(j)ft-VI '0 .n-
defenses raised by the defendant, and explai.ned ill theaex-t instruction. Tfyon find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of the propositions in this instruction has not been 
proved, your verdict should be for Ha.rtford. 
J lDGE 
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INSTRUCTION NO. \ '3 . 
or corPO'-QJ;o- ~\\--. ~ /'J..'b/ \0 
A personl\.who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimjze the damage 
and prevent ftnther damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be 
recovered. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. \. Lt 
The corporation involved in this case is entitled to the same fair and unprejudiced 
treatment that an individual would be under like circumstances. You should decide this case with 
the same impartiality that you would use in deciding a case between individuals. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ,s-, 
If the jury decides Lakeland is entitled to recover from Hartford, the jury must detenninc 
the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate Lakeland for any of the 
following elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from Hartford's breach 
of contract: 
Business Income policy amounts for the time period November 1, 
200S to a elate no later than January 28, 2009, in an amount not to 
exceed $19,052. 
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to detennine. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, ! do not express any opinion 
as to whether plaintiff is entitled to damages. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
You will each receive a copy of the instructions. 
The original instructions will also accompany you in to the jury room. If I have 
made any changes to these instructions, I will tell you about those changes and I will note 
the changes on the original instructions. Please do not write on m mark th~ original 
instructions, as they are part of the official record. 
The instructions are numbered for the convenience of the court and counsel in 
referring to specific instructions. There mayor may not be a gap in the numbering of the 
instructions. If there is, you should not concern yourselves about such gap. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
Upon retiring to the jury room, select one of you as a presiding officer, who will 
preside over your deliberations. It is his or her duty to see that your discussion is carried 
on in a sensible and orderly fashion; that the issues submitted for your decision are fully 
and fairly discussed; and that every juror has a chance to express himself or herself upon 
each question. 
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with these instructions. 
Follow these directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of 
you by the instructions on the verdict form. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As 
soon as nine or more of you have agreed upon a verdict. you should fill it out as 
instructed, and have it signed. If there is more than one question on the verdict form. it is 
not necessary that the same nine agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, 
your presiding officer alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, 
agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict form. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict form, notify the bailiff. who 
will then return you into open court. 
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or 
decide any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If 
money damages are to be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may 
not agree in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the 
method of determining the amount of the damage award or percentage of negligence. 
If, after considering all of the instructions in their entirety, and after having fully 
discussed the evidence before you, the jury determines that it is necessary to 
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You should not try to communicate with me by any means other than such a note. 
416 
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on 
any of the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by 
me. 
J 
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INSTRUCT!ON NO. 20 
! have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you 
regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. 
1n a few minutes counsel will present their dosing arguments to you and then you will 
retire to the jury room for your deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, 
the attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At 
the outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to makean emphatic 
expression of opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one 
does that at the beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be 
reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are 
not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no 
triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the 
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after 
a discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
As jurors you have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate before 
making your individual decisions. You should fully and fairly discuss among yourselves 
all of the evidence you have seen and heard in this courtroom about this case, together 
with the law that relates to this case as contained in my instructions. 
During the course of deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views 
and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest 
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,,--_ ... _._ ... _. __ .. _._.-_ .... _._._._._-_ ... _.--_. 
opinion as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow 
jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 1 
In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to usc in returning your yerdicl. This 
form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict fonn to you 
now. 
-L 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2-2-.-
There is no dispute in this case that Art Bistline was the agent of the principal, 
Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC, at the time of the transactions described by the 
evidence. Therefore, Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC, the principal, is responsible 
for any act of Ali Bistline, the agent, within the scope of the agent's authority. 
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rKltULANUtK HAYI~t::i MlllHtLL ::iIUW NO·QbIJ ~. I 
IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST H)DICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LAKELAND TRUE V ALUE HARDWARE, 
LLC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs .. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No .. CV-08-7069 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:. 
Question No. 1: Did Hartford correctly determine the end date or the period of restoration? 
YES -X 
or 
NO 
DEPUTY' 
{f you answered '·'No '.' on Question No.1, please proceed to Question No.2. If, instead, you 
answered "Yes" to Question No .. 1, you are now finished: do not am-Mer any other questions.. 
Question No.2: Did Lakeland fail to provide Hartford with information and documentation in 
support of its claim in accord with the terms of the Policy, which resulted in Hartford being 
unable to correctly calculate the period of restoration? 
YES 
or 
NO 
If you answered 'No" on Question No.2, please proceed to Question No 3. {f, instead, you 
answered" Yes ,j to Question No.2, you are nowfinished, do not answer any other questions. 
Question No.3: With respect to Qnestion No.3, we the jury find that the value of the Business 
Income claim amount between November 1, 2008 and January 27, 2009 to be 
$ .(this amount cannot exceed $19, 052) R. 3rd Addeo. 
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SPECIAL VERDICT-l 
Jun, I, LUlU ~,::JItAIYI rKltULAIWtK HAYI~t0 MllGHtLL 01()W I~O,Dbl0 ~,!. 
if you entered any dollar amounl in your answer 10 Question No.3, please proceed to Question 
No.4. If," instead, you entered "$0" as your answer to Question No.3, you are now.finished, do 
not amwer any other questions. 
Question No.4: As to Business Personal Property coverage, did Lakeland fail to prevent or 
avoid any of its damages it. claims? 
YBS 
or 
NO 
If "YES", we the jury find that Lakeland failed to mitigate __ % ofits damages .. 
Regardless of your answer to Question No.4, you are nowfinished 
When you have answered the above questions, sign the verdict form as explained in 
another instruction and inform the bailiff that you have concluded your deliberations. ll1e Court 
will know what to do with your answers. 
Please sign the special verdict form and advise the bailiff that you have concluded your 
deliberations .. 
DATED this 
SPECIAL VERDICT. 2 
, ..t 
;).11 day of ~ 2010. 
, .~. (J)J---' 
Forepcrson 
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ARTIiUR M. BISTLINE 
LAW OFFICE OF ARTIDJR M. BISTLINE 
1423 N Government Way 
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83814 
(208) 665-7270 
(208) 665-7290 (fax) 
ISB: 5216 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STATE OF IDAHO } Ss 
COl '~1'1'V rV 'It·i:''T~·It.' )1' , '.j( . ''''.' .,1',. ,I 
FILED: . 
. o:;)n W~\I -Ii, pto~?: I I (,'~ .;), , 1 -, I I ~N 
i 
"I cr"", ... -.,cl1·[,J'f"T CO Yf I.e. C":\ c.)',.l ,.," Uh 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
LAlNTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT 
LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDW ARE~ ITNESS DISCLOSURE 
LLC, ~~Di~10~~ 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
THE HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE 
COMP ANY, a Connecticut corporation, 
Defendant. 
, 
The Plaintiff, LAKELAND TRUE VALUE HARDWARE, LLC, by and through their 
undersigned counsel, hereby file this supplemental disclosure of exp,ert witness reports as 
follows: 
1. Report ofR-obert Underdown, and list of related documents, at Exhibit A. 
'/~ Respectfully submitted this __ oay of November, 2009. 
ARTHUR M. ~ISTLINE 
PLAINTIFfS'EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE· 1 
------~----. --'. 
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EXPERT REPORT 
ROBERT E. UNDERDOWN, Arc, ARM 
RE: Lakeland True Value Hardware, L.L.C. vs. The Hartford, a 
Connecticut corporation Case No. CV08-7069 
1. My name is Robert Underdown. I am over the age of 21, and my place of 
business is 8030 E. Gary Road, Scottsdale, Arizona 85260. Plaintiff, Lakeland True 
Value Hardware, L.L.C. has retained me as an expert in this case. 
2. In preparation for this report, I reviewed documents provided to me by 
counsel for Lakeland True Value Hardware, L.L.C. A list of these documents is attached 
to this report. 
3. As evidence of my qualifications, my Curriculum Vitae are attached. I have 
been in the insurance industry for over 30 years, and for 20 of those years I was a 
Corporate Risk Manager responsible for purchasing insurance for a number of public 
and private corporations. 
4. My opinion is based on my experience, training and education as a Claims 
Adjuster, Claims Supervisor, Claims Manager and a Risk Manager. I have experience 
as a Claims Adjuster, Claims Supervisor and as a Claims Manager both for an 
independent third-party claims administrator and for an insurance company. I have been 
a Risk Manager for public and private entities and supervised staff adjusters. I am a 
member of the Risk and Insurance Management Society and the American Association 
of Insurance Management Consultants and actively pursue new consulting cases in the 
area of general insurance and risk management issues in addition to my practice as an 
insurance expert witness. 
5. Additionally, I am currently licensed as an insurance producer in the State of 
Arizona. 
6. WIth regard to this case, I have been retained at the rate of $250 per hour 
for case file development in my office and $395 per hour for deposition and trial 
testimony, plus expenses, with a minimum fee of $1,975 per day or any portion tlhram.Adden. 
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BACKGROUND 
On January 28,2008, the roof collapsed on the building that Lakeland True Value 
Hardware, 1.1.C. (hereafter "Lakeland") was leasing for the operation of their business. 
Lakeland's insurance company, Hartford, acknowledged coverage and assigned the 
claim to Sedgwick Claims Management ("Sedgwick") for adjusting. The Sedgwick office 
is located in Charlotte, North Carolina, so Sedgwick retained GAB Robbins in Seattle 
and others to assist in the resolution of the claim. The Hartford policy provided coverage 
for Building, Business property and loss of Business income. 
OPINIONS 
It is my opinion that when dealing with an insurance claim such as Lakeland's for loss of 
business income, the insurance company is required to pay special atlention to the 
claim's handling because their insured is reliant solely on the insurance proceeds to 
replace income that was lost because of a covered event. Because of this, in most 
claims operations, the business income losses are handled by senior adjusters. 
The fact that the insured Lakeland was required to take out loans to get their business 
back into operation indicates that Hartford failed in their duty to the insured under the 
policy because that is the exact reason for the coverage. As a result of Hartford's failure 
to make timely payments under the business income and extra expense portions of the 
policy, the insured was forced to undergo unnecessary hardships. 
Under the Hartford insurance policy, the duties of the insured are described on page 20. 
It is my opinion that, in this case, the insured complied with all the required duties such 
as: (a) Giving prompt notice, (b) giving a description of the 100~s, (c) taking all reasonable 
steps to protect the property, (d) giving complete inventories {this task was undertaken 
by the independent claims adjuster GAB Robbins at the direction of the TPA who 
handled claims for Hartford), (e) permitting inspection of the property and records. Thus, 
the insured Lakeland complied with their duties under the policy. 
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It is my opinion that Hartford, on the other hand, did not comply with their duties to make 
timely payments to their insured who had complied with aI/ the requirements of the 
policy. As a result, the handling of the claim by Hartford did not comply with the Idaho 
Unfair Claim Settlement practice statute. It is my opinion that first, Hartford did not 
attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt. fair and equitable settlement even though 
the liability for the loss of business income was clear. In addition, it is my opinion that 
Hartford has compelled their insured lakeland to institute litigation to recover amounts 
due under the insurance policy by offering substantially less than the claim is worth due 
to the protracted nature of the claim handling by Hartford. 
According to the affidavit of Dan Harper, on March 5, 2008, multiple financial documents 
and information - enough for Harper to create the schedule at Exhibit B of his affidavit-
were made available to Hartford by the Lakeland and/or its agents. It is my opinion that 
there was enough information in these documents for Hartford to begin issuing regu1ar 
payments to the insured in compliance with industry standards. However, Hartford 
withheld payments instead, insisting on additional documentation before beginning to 
make the payments. As a standard industry practice, the payments should have begun 
shortly after the information identified at Harper's Affidavit, paragraph five, was 
submitted; no more than fourteen calendar days from receipt of such information. Any 
corrections would have been calculated in the final payment. In addition, there was no 
need to require purchase receipts, as Hartford had agreed to have the salvor prepare 
an inventory. 
Hartford had a duty to agree on the scope of the loss. As a practical matter, the most 
expedient way to develop the scope of loss was to have the !:;alvage company complete 
an inventory as they handled the salvage operation. Due to confusion on the part of the 
adjuster, the salvage and inventory operations were halted improperly as the claim 
supervisor Reynolds indicated in a note dated 09f04/0B (H000153). Reynold says, "I 
see where you talk about the salvage in your prior notes, but that was 2-3 months ago. 
Where are we on it?" Reynold further says, "You need to jump a/l over this and get the 
answers you need form the salvor." 
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CONCLUSION 
Prior to the admonition on 09/04108, there was a note to JUlia Kale on 07111/2008 
(H000114) "Ok, we need to stop fooling around with the insured here." It is my opinion 
that Ms. Kale's supervisor was aware at that time that the adjuster was not properly 
handling the Lakeland claim. That was because, at that time, there had not been 
enough done on the part of Hartford and their adjuster to put the insured back into their 
pre-loss state. There were a lot of file notes, but not much activity. 
Throughout the claim notes there was talk of "coordinating" with the salvors. It is my 
opinion that it would have been very simple to have the salvors perform an inventory 
and to use that to proceed to conclude the claim. The inventory combined with the 
accounting information that was provided by Lakeland and/or its agents should have 
been enough information for Hartford to begin making regular payments. The funds 
should have been advanced to allow the stock and fixtures to be ordered in a timely 
manner to get the insured back in business. As a result, it is my opinion that this claim 
was mishandled from the beginning. 
Hartford failed to make regular and timely payments to the insured, who had complied 
with the policy provisions and provided Hartford with the necessary documentation to 
begin issuing checks at regular - at least monthly - intervals. Hartford mishandled the 
claim from the beginning by not ordering the salvage company to perform an inventory 
as they removed the stock and fixtures from the damaged building. Hartford then 
continued to request information that was not necessary to begin issuing checks to the 
insured. 
It is my opinion that Hartford's actions in improperly handling this ciaim caused a severe 
financial distress to their policyholder. The criticism of the handling of this claim is clear 
from the file notes. It is my opinion that Hartford's actions fell substantially and grossly 
below the standard of care for insurance companies handling loss of business income 
claims 
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DATED this Y day of November, 2009 
Robert E. Underdown, Ale, ARM 
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